

Platon

c Ano, to jest velmi k smíchu.

Jak by ne, děl jsem, když na jedné straně nám vychytají, že neznáme dobra, a hned zase k nám mluví, jako bychom je znali? Vždyť říkají, že jest to rozumové poznání dobra, jako bychom my jim rozuměli, co si myslí, když se z jejich úst ozve slovo „dobro“.

Jistá pravda.

A co ti, kteří ve svém výměru činí dobrem rozkoš? Jest ten blud, kterým jsou naplněni, snad o něco menší než u těch druhých? Či nebývají i tyto nuceni uznati, že jsou na světě zlé rozkoše?

Dozajista.

d Nakonec tedy, myslím, musí uznati, že tytéž věci jsou dobré i zlé. Či ne?

Ano.

Není-li tedy zřejmé, že jsou při té věci veliké a četné spory? Jak by ne?

A tohle není zřejmé, že pokud jde o spravedlivé a krásné, mnozí si zvolí spravedlivé a krásné jen zdánlivé, a třeba by to nebylo nic skutečného, přece to dělají, mají v držení a působí tím na zdání, ale jde-li o dobro, nikomu již nestačí mítí dobro zdánlivé, nýbrž hledají skutečného a zdáním zde každý pohrdá?

Ba věru.

e Nuže tedy, v tom, za čím spěje každá duše a proč všechno koná – tuší sice, že to jest něco velikého, ale nezná jistoty a nemůže dostatečně postihnouti podstaty toho, ani spokojiti se trvalou vírou jako při ostatních věcech, a proto ztrácí prospěch i z toho ostatního, byl-li jaký –, v takové tedy a tak veliké věci měli by snad také tak býti zatemění i ti nejlepší lidé v obci, kterým dáme všechno do rukou?

Nikoli.

Domnívám se aspoň, že věci spravedlivé a krásné neměly by valného strážce v tom, kdo by neznal, v čem vůbec záleží to, že jsou dobré; tuším pak, že jich nikdo dříve náležitě nepozná.

Jisté dobře tušíš.

Tedy budeme mítí ústavu obce dokonale zařízenou, bude-li na ni dozíratí takovýto strážce, znalý této věci?

18. Nutně, odpovídal Adeimantos. Avšak co ty, Sókrate, nazýváš dobrem? Vědění, či rozkoš, či něco jiného než toto?

Tu ho máme! Však bylo to již dávno na tobě dobře viděti, že ti nepostačí mínění ostatních o těch věcech.

Vždyť se mi nezdá, Sókrate, ani spravedlivé umění pověděti mínění ostatních lidí, a svého vlastního ne, když se někdo takový čas zabývá těmito otázkami.

c Jakže, to se ti zdá spravedlivé, aby někdo mluvil o tom, co nezná, jako by to znal?

To nikoli, jako by to znal, nýbrž jen jako mínění, aby tedy byl ochoten říci, co míní.

Jakže, to jsi dosud nevyozoroval, že všechna mínění bez vědění jsou špatná? Nejlepší z nich jsou slepá – či zdá se ti, že lidé nalézající pouhým míněním bez rozumové činnosti něco pravdivého liší se něčím od slepců po cestě správně kráčejících?

Ničím se nelíší.

Chceš tedy se dívatí na věci špatné, slepé a křivé, ač můžeš od jiných slyšetí jasně a krásně?

d Probbh, Sókrate, pravil Glaukón, jen neustávej, jako bys byl již u konce. Zajisté nám postačí, jen když vyložíš i o dobru tak, jako jsi vyložil o spravedlnosti a uměřenosti a ostatním.

e Ano, i mně, přáteli, to docela postačí; ale jen abych nebyl k tomu neschopen a za všechnu ochotu si svou neobratností neutříl posměchu. Než, moji milí, otázku o podstatě dobra nechme prozatím býti – zdá se mi to totiž příliš těžkou úlohou, abychom s tímto rozbehem dospěli nyní jen k tomu, co o tom míním –, avšak o tom, co se jeví být díletem dobra, jemu velmi podobným, chci mluvíti, je-li i vám mílo, pakli však ne, nechám toho.

o sluně

Nuže mluv; dlužné vypravování o otci nám zajistí splatíš až podruhé.

157 Chtěl bych, řekl jsem, abych mohl celý ten dluh zaplatit a vy abyste jej přijali, a ne jako nyní jen úroky. Nuže tedy, přijměte za úrok toto dítě dobra samého. Ale dejte si pozor, abych vás snad proti své vůli neošidil a nepodal vám přitom něco nepravého.

Dáme si pozor, seč budeme; nuže, jen mluv.

Ano, ale napřed vám připomenu, co jsme nahoře pověděli i co bylo již jinde často pověděno, a dohodneme se o tom.

b Co jest to?

Říkáme, odpověděl jsem, že jest mnoho věcí krásných a mnoho dobrých a tak dále, a v řeči je rozeznáváme. Ano, říkáme.

A ovšem také krásno i dobro samo a tak při všech jevech, při kterých jsme tehdy uznávali množství, mluvíme zase o podstatě jednoho každého, uznávající při každém jednu ideu jako znak pro každou věc.

Tak jest.

c o o prvních říkáme, že to vidíme, ale rozumem nevnímáme, o ideách pak zase, že je rozumem vnímáme, ale nevidíme.

Docela tak.

Kteroupak částí své bytosti vidíme viděné předměty?

Zrakem.

Zajisté pak i sluchem vnímáme věci slyšené a ostatními smysly všechny předměty čítí?

Ovšem.

Zdalipak jsi přemýšlel o tom, kterou nejcennější přednost dal tvůrce našich smyslů schopnosti viděti i býti viděn?

Mnoho ne.

d Nuže uvažuj takto. Potřebuje snad sluch a zvuk ještě třetí věci,¹⁵⁰ onen, aby slyšel, tento, aby byl slyšen, takže když ta třetí věc nepřistoupí, sluch nebude slyšeti a zvuk nebude slyšen?

Nepotřebuje.

Myslím, že ani mnohé jiné schopnosti, abych něktekl, že žádána, nepotřebují ničeho takového. Či ty můžeš některou uvéstí? Nikoli.

Nepozoruješ však, že schopnost zraku i viditelnost věci viděné toho potřebuje?

Jak to?

I když jest v očích zrak a jeho majetník se pokouší ho užívatí, před očima pak jest barva, nepřistoupí-li k tomu třetí věc, právě k tomuto úkolu přírodou zvlášť určená, víš, že zrak nevidí nic a barvy že budou neviděny.

Co to myslíš?

To, co ty nazýváš světlem.

Máš pravdu.

Není to tedy nepatrná věc, která dodává svazu spojujícímu smysl zrakový a schopnost býti viděn větší vzácnosti nad ostatní svazky, ač není-li světlo něco bezcenného.

To jistě nelze říci, že by to bylo něco bezcenného.

19. Nuže, kterému z bohů na nebi můžeš přičísti tuto moc, že nám jeho světlo dává, aby zrak co nejkrásněji viděl a viděné předměty byly viděny?

Tomu, kterému i ty i ostatní lidé; jest zajisté patrné, že se tážeš na slunce.

Zdalipak se tedy má zrak k tomuto bohu tímto způsobem?

Jak?

Zrak není sluncem, ani sám, ani to, v čem vzniká a čemu říkáme oko.

To věru ne.

Avšak jest, myslím, ze smyslových ústrojí ústrojím slunci nejbližším.

Mnohem nejbližším.

Jisté tedy i výkonnost, kterou má a kterou přiděluje slunce, dostává od tohoto jako jeho výron? Ovšemže.

Není-li tedy pravda, že ani slunce není sice zrakem, ale jsouc jeho příčinou, jest od něho samého viděno?

Tak.

To tedy věz, že myslím tím dítětem dobra, jež dobro zplodilo jako svou obdobu, aby totiž, čím jest samo ve světě pomyslňm vzhledem k rozumu a předmětům rozumového vnímání, tím aby bylo toto ve světě viditelném vzhledem ke zraku a předmětům viděným.

Jak to? otázal se; ještě lépe mi to vylož.

S očima, jak víš, jest tomu tak, že kdykoli je někdo obrací na ony předměty, na jejichž barvách se prostrá nikoli denní světlo, nýbrž noční přísvit, nevidí dobře a jsou skoro jako slepé, jako by v nich nebylo čistého zraku. Zajiště.

Kdykoli je však obrátí na předměty, na které svítí slunce, tu myslím vidí jasně a jest zjevno, že v týchž očích je zrak. Ovšem.

Takovým způsobem tedy pozoruj i jevy duševní, a to tak: kdykoli se duše upře na to, nač svítí pravda a jsoucno, pochopí to a pozná a jest patmo, že má rozum; kdykoli však na to, co jest smíšeno s tmou, na jev vznikající a hynoucí, tehdy jen nejasně míní a špatně vidí, sem a tam svá mínění převracejíc, a tu zase se zdá, jako by neměla rozumu. Ano, podobá se.

To tedy, co poznávaným věcem poskytuje pravdu a poznávajícím jeho výkonnou schopnost, věz, že jest idea dobra; ona jest příčinou rozumového vědění a pravdy, neboť ta jest poznávaným předmětem, a tak, ačkoli obojí jest krásné, i poznání i pravda, správně učíš, budeš-li onu ideu pokládati za něco jiného a ještě krásnějšího nad toto obojí; co pak se týče rozumového vědění a pravdy, jako tam jest správné světlo a zrak pokládati za věci slunci blízké, ale pokládati je za slunce by nebylo správné, tak také i zde pokládati toto obojí za věci blízké dobru jest správné, ale není správné pokládati jedno nebo

druhé z nich za dobro samo, nýbrž významu dobra, jest ještě více ceniti.

Nevýslovná to krása podle tvé řeči, když poskytuje vědění a pravdy, ale sama nad tyto věci krásou vyniká; vždyť přece jest tím nemyslíš rozkoš.

Zadrž hříšná slova, odpověděl jsem; ale raději ještě pozoruj jeho obraz tímto způsobem.

Jak?

O slunci, myslím, řekneš, že viditelným věcem dává netoliko možnost, aby byly viděny, nýbrž i vznik a vzrůst a výživu, ač samo není vznikem?

Jak jinak?

Řci tedy, že i předměty poznání mají od dobra nejen to, že jsou poznávány, nýbrž že se jim od něho dostává i bytí a jsoucnosti, ačkoli dobro není jsoucnost, nýbrž vyniká ještě nad jsoucnost dátojností a mocí.

20. Tu zvolal Glaukón s velmi komickým výrazem: Apollóné, jaká to nadlidská výše!

Ano, sám jsi tím vinen, protože jsi mě nutil, abych řekl o tom své mínění.

A nesmíš ustati, nýbrž, když už nic jiného, vylož aspoň to podobenství se sluncem, jestliže ti něco zbývá.


Ba jistě zbývá, a mnoho.

Nesmíš tedy ani dost málo z toho vnechatí.

Myšlím, děl jsem, že naopak mnoho vnechám; přece však, pokud jest v přítomné chvíli možno, úmyslně nevynechám nic. Nevynechávej.

Pomysli si tedy, že idea dobra a slunce jsou, jak jsme pravili, dvě mocnosti a že kralují jedna nad rozumovým rodem a krajem, druhá pak nad viditelným – něčtenu „světem“, aby se ti nezdálo, že dělám umělé hříčky se slovem „světlo“. 131 Nuže tedy, máš na mysli těchto dvě podob, viditelné a pomyslíné?

Mám.



Představ si tedy, že to jest, jako bys vzal přímku,¹³² rozdělenu ve dva nerovné úseky; pak rozděl dále jeden i druhý úsek v téměř poměru, úsek náležitější oboru viditelnému i úsek oboru pomyslného, a dostaneš podle poměrné zřetelnosti a nezřetelnosti v oboru viditelném jeden úsek jakožto obrazy – těmi obrazy pak myslím především stíny, dále zrcadlení na vodě i na všem, co má pevnou, hladkou a lesklou plochu, a všechno takové, rozumíš-li mi.

Však rozumím.

Druhým pak úsekem budíš ti tedy to, co tyto obrazy představují, živočišné kolem nás, všechno rostlinstvo a vše, co náleží mezi umělé výrobky.

Dobře.

Zdalipak by se ti chtělo o tom viditelném oboru říci, že poměrný rozdíl tu záleží v pravdě a nedostatku pravdy, že jako se má předmět mýlně k předmětu poznání, tak se má napodobenina k napodobenému předmětu?

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Ano, zcela jistě.

Pozoruj tedy dále i dělení oboru pomyslného, jak by se mělo provéstí.

Jak?

Tak, že v jednom úseku jeho jest duše nucena hledati z předpokladů tím způsobem, že užívá tamtěch předmětů napodobování jako obrazů, přičemž postupuje ne směrem k počátku, nýbrž ke konci, kdežto v druhém, směřujícím k naprostému začátku, jde od předpokladů a koná svou cestu bez obrazů potřebných prvnímu úseku, jen s pojmy samými o sobě.

Těmto slovům jsem dobře neporozuměl

c Nuže ještě jednou, odpověď jsem; zajisté snáze porozumíš, bude-li toto předesláno. Jak bezpochyby víš, ti, kdo se zabývají měřivím a počty a podobnými věcmi, předpokládají při každém postupu liché a sudé, tvary, trojí druh úhlů a jiné věci s tím příbuzné; myslíce si, že tyto pojmy znají, učiní si je předpoklady a nepokládají již dále za potřebno je dokazovati ani

sobě ani jiným, jako by šlo o věci každému jasné, nýbrž počínajíce od nich, probírají hned věci další a nakonec přicházejí rovnou k tomu, co si byli učinili cílem svého zkoumání.

Ovšem, to dobře vím.

Nuže, jak také dále víš, užívají viditelných podob a vykládají o nich, aniž mají na mysli tyto, nýbrž ony, které tyto představují, jako například jest účelem jejich výkladu čtverec sám a úhlopříčka sama, a ne ta, kterou kreslí, a tak dále; tyto jejich výtvary a výkresy mohou způsobovati i stíny i obrazy na vodních hladinách, ale oni jich samých užívají zase jako obrazů, hledíce však spatřiti ona jsoucna sama, jichž není možno spatřiti jinak než myšlením.

Pravdu díš.

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21. O tomto tedy oboru jsem mluvil jako o pomyslném, ale tak, že duše jest nucena při jeho zkoumání užívatí předpokladů¹³³ a nejde k počátku, protože nemůže vystoupiti výše nad ty předpoklady, nýbrž užívá za obrazy těch věcí samých, které jsou vzory obrazů nižšího druhu, věcí, které také jsou proti oněm obrazům uznány a ceňeny jakožto zřetelné.

Rozumím, pravil, že mluvíš o tom, co náleží do oboru měřiví a věd s ním příbuzných.

Druhým tedy úsekem pomyslného oboru rozuměj, že myslím to, co chápe rozum sám mocí dialektiky, maje své předpoklady ne za počátky, nýbrž za předpoklady v pravém slova smyslu, jako za výstupky a východiště, aby došel až po to, co jest bez předpokladů,¹³⁴ k počátku všeho, a pak aby chopě se toho zase nazpět sestupoval až ke konci, drže se toho, co s tím souvisí, neuzívaje přitom ku pomoci docela žádného jevu smyslného, nýbrž idejí samých o sobě a jejich postupných vztahů, a tak končil v ideji.

Rozumím, pravil, docela dobře sice ne – zdá se mi totiž, že práce, o které mluvíš, jest velmi rozsáhlá –, že však chceš určitě stanoviti, že jasnější jest to, co se spatřuje dialektickým věděním v oboru jsoucna a pomyslna, nežli to, co takzvanými vě-

dami, které mají za počátky předpoklady; diváci jsou sice nuponevadž pozorují ne z výše samého počátku, nýbrž ze stanovíště předpokladů, proto se ti zdá, že při těch předmětech nedocházejí rozumového poznání, ačkoli jsou rozumu přístupné i se svým počátkem. Tu činnost geometrií a podobných odborníků nazýváš, jak se mi zdá, myšlením, ale ne rozuměním, pokládá se myšlení za něco uprostřed mezi míněním a rozumem.

Docela dobře jsi to pochopil. A tak uznvej, že těm čtyřem úsekům odpovídají v duši tyto čtyři stavy, rozumové poznání a k nejhořejšímu, myšlení druhému, ke třetímu přidej věření a k poslednímu dohadování, a seřaď je v náležitém poměru podle zásady, že jim náleží taková míra jasnosti, jak veliká míra pravdy náleží jejich předmětům.

rozumím, uznávám a seřazuji, jak pravíš.

Knihá sedmá

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1. A nyní, pokračoval jsem, představ si rozdíl mezi duší vzdělanou a nevzdělanou tímto podobností. Pomyšli si lidi jako v podzemním obydlí, podobném jeskyni, jež má ke světu otevřen dlouhý vchod zšíří celé jeskyně; v tomto obydlí již od dětství žijí spoutaní na nohou i na šíjích, takže zůstávají stále na témže místě a vidí jedině dopředu, ale nemožou otáčet hlavy, protože jim pouta brání; vysoko a daleko vzadu za nimi hoří oheň a uprostřed mezi ohněm a spoutanými vězni jest nahoře příčná cesta, podél níž si myslí vystavěnou zídku na způsob přepážek, jaké mívají před sebou kejklíři a nad kterými ukazují své kousky.

Dobře.

Mysli si pak, že podél této zídky chodí lidé a nosí všelijaké nářadí, přecházející nad zídku, také podoby lidí a zvířat z kamene i ze dřeva i všelijak vyrobené, přičemž jedni z nosičů, jak se podobá, mluví, druzí pak mlčí.

Divný jest ten tvůj obraz a divní věžňové.

Podobní nám, odpověděl jsem; neboť takoví lidé jistě by neviděli ze sebe samých ani ze svých druhů něco více než stíny vrhané ohněm na protější stěnu jeskyně.

Jak by také uviděli, když jsou nuceni držeti po celý život hlavu bez pohnutí?

A co předměty nošené podél zídky? Neviděli by z nich právě tolik?

Ovšemže.

A kdyby mohli vespolek rozmlouvat, jistě by mysleli, že těmi jmény, která dávají tomu, co před sebou vidí, označují skutečné předměty. Nunně.

→
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O jeskyni

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A což kdyby to vězení odráželo od protějška i ozvěnu? Kdykoli by promluvil někdo z přecházejících nosičů, nemyslíš, že by pokládali za původ toho hlasu jediné právě ten přecházející stín?

Při Diuvi, dozajista.

c U takových lidí tedy, děl jsem, by veskrze za pravdu neplatilo nic jiného než stíny těch umělých věcí.

Docela nutně.

Nuže pozoruj, jak by to asi bylo s jejich vyproštěním a vyléčením z pout a nerozumnosti, kdyby se jim ho přirozeně dostalo, a to takto. Jeden z nich jest vyproštěn z pout a přinucen náhle vstáti a otočiti šjí a jíti a hleděti vzhůru ke světlu. Z toho všeho by cítil bolest a pro mžítky v očích nebyl by schopen divati se na ony předměty, jejichž stíny tenkráté viděl: co by asi řekl, kdyby mu někdo tvrdil, že tenkráté viděl jen přeludy, nyní však že zří správněji, jsa mnohem blíže skutečnosti a obrácen k předmětům skutečnějším, a kdyby ho nutil, ukazuje mu na každý z přecházejících předmětů, odpovídati na otázku, co to jest? Nemyslíš, že by byl v nesnázích a domníval se, že věci, které tehdy viděl, byly pravdivější než ty, které mu jsou nyní ukazovány?

Mnohem pravdivější.

e 2. Nuže, a kdyby ho docela nutil hleděti do světa samého, že by ho bolely oči a že by se obracel a utíkal k tomu, nač se dovede dívat, a měl za to, že toto jest vskutku zřetelnější, než co se mu ukazuje?

Tak jest.

Kdyby pak jej někdo odtamtud násilím vlekl tím drsným a příkrým východem a dříve ho nepustil, až by ho vyvlekl na světlo sluneční, zdalipak by při tom vlečení netrpěl bolestí a nevzpouzel se, a když by přišel na světlo, zdalipak by jeho oči, zalité zář, mohly viděti něco z toho, co by mu nyní bylo jmenováno skutečným světem?

Jistě ne, aspoň ne hned.

Ano, myslím, že by potřeboval si zvyknouti, kdyby chtěl uviděti, co jest nahoře. A nejprve by zíral nejspíše na stíny a potom na obrazy lidí i ostatních předmětů zrcadlící se na vodních plochách, později pak na ty předměty samy; dále pak by snesl pohled na tělesa nebeská a na samu oblohu snáze v noci, kdy by se díval na světlo hvězd a měsíce, než ve dne na slunce a sluneční světlo.

Jak by ne?

Konečně pak, myslím, byl by s to, aby popatřil na slunce, ne na jeho obrazy ve vodě nebo na nějaké jiné ploše, nýbrž na ně samo o sobě na jeho vlastním místě, a aby se podíval, jaké jest. Nutně.

A potom již by si o něm učinil úsudek, že ono jest, co způsobuje roční počasi a oběh roků a všechno spravuje ve viditelném světě, a že jest nějak původcem i všeho toho, co viděti tam dole.

Patrně, že by k tomu potom došel.

A což když si vzpomene na své dřívější obydlí a na tamější vědění a tehdejší své spoluvězně, nemyslíš, že by sám sebe pokládal za šťastného pro tu změnu, oněch pak by litoval? Ba jistě.

A jestliže měli tehdy mezi sebou zavedeny nějaké pocty a pochvaly a dary pro toho, kdo by nejbystřeji viděl přecházející stíny a nejlépe si pamatoval, které z nich obyčejně chodily napřed, které pozadu a které pospolu, a podle toho byl nejschopnější předpovídati, co přijde, sotva by asi cítil po tom touhu a záviděl těm, kterým se u oněch dostává poct a mocných postavení; naopak jistě by mu bylo, jak praví Homér, že by tuze rád chtěl „jako nádeník sloužiti jinému, muži nemajetnému“¹³⁵ a raději by cokoliv zakusil, než aby měl ony nejasné představy a oním způsobem žít; či nemyslíš?

Tak jest, odpověděl, myslím, že by raději všeho zakusil, než aby žil oním způsobem.

Uvaž i toto, děl jsem. Kdyby takový člověk sestoupil nazpět a posadil se na totéž místo, zdali by se mu oči nenaplnily tmou, když by náhle přišel ze slunce?

Ba jistě.

Tu pak, kdyby zase musel posuzovati ony stíny o závod s oněmi, kteří zůstali stále vězni, dokud má mžitky před očima a dříve, než by se mu oči uklidnily – a toto zvykání by netrvalo zrovna krátce –, zdalipak by nebyl k smíchu a zdali by se o něm neřeklo, že přišel z té cesty nahoru se zkaženým zrakem a že to nestojí ani za pokus choditi tam nahoru? A kdyby se někdo pokoušel je vyprošovati z pout a vésti nahoru, zdalipak by ho nezabili, kdyby ho nějak mohli rukama uchopiti a zabít?

Dozajista.

3. Tento tedy obraz, milý Glaukóne, připojme celý k tomu, co bylo řečeno nahoře: prostor jevíci se zraku jest jako ten žalární přibýtek a světlo ohně v něm hořícího je síla slunce; k tomu pokládej výstup nahoru a dívání se na věci nahoře za vzestoupení duše do pomyslné oblasti a nechybiš se mého mínění, když si je přeješ slyšeti. Bůh sám ví, zdali jest pravdivé. Nuže, jak já to vidím, jest to tak: v oboru poznání spátruje se na konci, a to jen stěží, idea dobra, když však jest spařena, jest o ní souditi, že ona jest všemu původcem všeho pravého a krásného, neboť i ve světě viditelném zrodila světlo a jeho pána, slunce, i v oboru pomyslném, kde jest sama paní, poskytlá lidem pravdu a rozum; jí musí spátriti ten, kdo chce rozumně jednat, ať v soukromí, ať v obci.

Souhlasné mínění mám i já, ovšem pokud tu mohu mluvit. Nuže tedy, děl jsem, utvoř si souhlasné mínění i v této věci a neďiv se, že ti, kdo došli až tam, nechtějí se starati o lidské věci, nýbrž jejich duše spějí vždy vzhůru a tam chtějí dlíti; to jest zajisté přirozené, jestliže se má ta věc podle vyloženého obrazu.

Ovšem, že to jest přirozené.

A dále se stává, že člověk, který přijde od dívání na věci božské do lidské bídý, neumí se zde chovati a jeví se velmi směšným, kdykoli jest nucen, dokud ještě špatně vidí a dříve, nežli si sdostatek zvykl přítomné tmě, na soudech nebo někde jinde zápasiti o stíny práva nebo o obrazy vrhající ty stíny a potýkati se o ně s názory lidí, kteří spravedlnosti samé nikdy nepatřili: myslíš, že to jeho chování je něco divného?

Ani dost málo to není divné.

Naopak, děl jsem, rozumný člověk by pamatoval, že jsou dva druhy poruchy zraku, vznikající ze dvojí příčiny, když totiž přecházíme ze světla do tmy a ze tmy do světla. Tu pak uznáv, že totéž se děje i s duší, nesmál by se nerozvážně, kdykoli by uviděl, že některá jest zmatena a nedovede se na něco dívati, nýbrž přihlížel by k tomu, zdali přichází ze světlejšího života, a proto jest od nezvyklosti omráčena tmou, či jde ze stavu velké nevědomosti do světlejšího prostředí a jest naplněna třpytem většího jasů; tu pak by jistě tuto nazval šťastnou pro její stav a život, druhé pak by politoval; a kdyby se jí chtěl smáti, byl by jeho smích méně směšný a pochopitelnější nežli smích, který by si činil z duše přicházející shora ze světla.

Ba věru, zcela správně mluvíš.

4. Je-li toto pravda, musíme si tedy učiniti o těch věcech takovéto mínění: že vzdělání není něco takového, za jaké je některí jeho učitelé vyhlašují. Říkají totiž, že do duše, ve které není vědění, oni je vkládají, jako by vkládali zrak do slepých očí.

Ano, to říkají.

Avšak nyníjší naše přemýšlení ukazuje, že jako nebylo možno oči obracet ke světlu od tmy jinak než zároveň s celým tělem, tak také že jest s celou duší otáčeti od proměnného dění tuto mohutnost obsaženou v duši každého a ústrojí, kterým člověk nabývá poznání, až nabude takové síly, že vydrží se dívati na jsooucno a na nejjasnější ze jsooucna; to pak jest podle našeho tvrzení dobro. Ano?

to whose hands we are to entrust all things? "Least of all," he said. "I fancy, at any rate," said I, "that the just and the honourable, if their relation and reference to the good is not known,^a will not have secured a guardian^b of much worth in the man thus ignorant, and my surmise is that no one will understand them adequately before he knows this." "You surmise well," he said. "Then our constitution will have its perfect and definitive organization^c only when such a guardian, who knows these things, oversees it."

XVIII. "Necessarily," he said. "But you yourself, Socrates, do you think that knowledge is the good or pleasure or something else and different?" "What a man it is," said I; "you made it very plain^d long ago that you would not be satisfied with what others think about it." "Why, it does not seem right to me either, Socrates," he said, "to be ready to state the opinions of others but not one's own when one has occupied himself with the matter so long.^e" "But then," said I, "do you think it right to speak as having knowledge about things one does not know?" "By no means," he said, "as having knowledge, but one ought to be willing to tell as his opinion what he opines." "Nay," said I, "have you not observed that opinions divorced from knowledge^f are ugly things? The best of them are blind.^g Or do you think that those who hold some

^a For the personal construction cf. 348 E, Isoc. *To Nic.* I. *καταφανής* is a variation in this idiom for *δηλος*. Cf. also *Theaet.* 189 c, *Symp.* 221 B, *Charm.* 162 c, etc.
^b Cf. 367 D-E.

^c This is not a contradiction of *Meno* 97 B, *Theaet.* 201 B-C, and *Phileb.* 62 A-B, but simply a different context and emphasis. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 47, nn. 338 and 339.

^d Cf. on 484 c, *Phaedr.* 270 E.

πόλει, οἷς πάντα ἐγχειριοῦμεν; "Ἡκιστά γ', ἔφη. Οἷμαι γοῦν, εἶπον, δίκαιά τε καὶ καλὰ ἀγροοῦμενα ὅπη ποτέ ἀγαθὰ ἔστων, οὐ πολλοῦ τινὸς ἄξιον φύλακα κεκτηῖσθαι ἀν' ἑαυτῶν τὸν τοῦτο ἀγροοῦντα, μαντεύομαι δὲ μηδένα αὐτὰ πρότερον γνώσεσθαι ἱκανῶς. Καλῶς γάρ, ἔφη, μαντεύει. Οὐκοῦν ἡμῖν Β ἢ πολιτεία τελέως κεκοσμήσεται, εἴαν ὁ τοιοῦτος αὐτὴν ἐπισκοπῇ φύλαξ, ὁ τούτων ἐπιστήμων;

XVIII. Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ σὺ δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, πρότερον ἐπιστήμην τὸ ἀγαθὸν φῆς εἶναι ἢ ἡδονήν; ἢ ἄλλο τι παρὰ ταῦτα; Οὗτος, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀνὴρ, καλῶς ἦσθα καὶ πάλαι καταφανής ὅτι σοὶ οὐκ ἀποχρήσοι τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκοῦν περὶ αὐτῶν. Οὐδὲ γὰρ δίκαιόν μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαίνεται τὰ τῶν ἄλλων μὲν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν δόγματα, τὸ δ' αὐτοῦ μὴ, τοσοῦτον χρόνον περὶ ταῦτα πραγματευόμενον. Τί δαί; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· δοκεῖ σοὶ δίκαιον εἶναι περὶ ὧν τις μὴ οἶδε λέγειν ὡς εἰδότα; Οὐδαμῶς γ', ἔφη, ὡς εἰδότα, ὡς μέντοι οἰόμενον ταῦθ' αἰοῖται ἐθέλειν λέγειν. Τί δέ; εἶπον· οὐκ ἦσθησαι τὰς ἀνευ ἐπιστήμης δόξας, ὡς πᾶσαι αἰσχραί; ὧν αἰ βέλτισται τυφλαί· ἢ δοκοῦσί τί σοι τυφλῶν

Cf. *Theaet.* 169 E.

^b The guardians must be able to give a reason, which they can do only by reference to the sanction. For the idea that the statesman must know better than other men cf. *Laws* 968 A, 964 c, 858 D-E, 817 c, Xen. *Mem.* iii. 6. 8.

^c For the effect of the future perfect cf. 457 B-λελέξεται, 465 A προστετέξεταί, Eurip. *Heraclidae* 980 πεπράξεταί.

διαφέρειν ὁδὸν ὀρθῶς πορευομένων οἱ ἄνευ νοῦ ἀληθῆς τι δοξάζοντες; Οὐδέν, ἔφη. Βούλει οὖν D αἰσχρὰ θεάσασθαι τυφλά τε καὶ σκόλια, ἐξὸν παρ' ἄλλων ἀκούειν φανά τε καὶ καλά; Μὴ πρὸς Διός, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Γλαύκων, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τέλει ὦν ἀποστῆς. ἀρκέσει γὰρ ἡμῖν, κἂν ὥσπερ δικαιοσύνης πέρι καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δηλῆθες, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ διέλθης. Καὶ γὰρ ἐμοί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, καὶ μάλα ἀρκέσει· ἀλλ' ὅπως μὴ οὐχ οἶός τ' ἔσομαι, προθυμούμενος δὲ ἀσχημονῶν γέλωτα ὀφλήσω. ἀλλ', ὦ μακάριοι, E αὐτὸ μὲν τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τᾶγαθόν, ἑάσωμεν τὸ νῦν εἶναι· πλεόν γὰρ μοι φαίνεται ἢ κατὰ τὴν παρ- οὔσαν ὀρμὴν ἐφικέσθαι τοῦ γε δοκοῦντος ἐμοὶ τὰ νῦν· ὅς δὲ ἔκγονός τε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φαίνεται καὶ ὁμοιότατος ἐκείνῳ, λέγειν ἐθέλω, εἰ καὶ ἡμῖν φίλον, εἰ δὲ μή, ἔαν. Ἄλλ', ἔφη, λέγε· εἰσαῦθις γὰρ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀποτίσεις τὴν διήγησιν. Βου- 507 λοίμην ἄν, εἶπον, ἐμέ τε δύνασθαι αὐτὴν ἀποδοῦναι

^a Probably an allusion to the revelation of the mysteries. Cf. *Phaedr.* 250 c, *Phileb.* 16 c, *Rep.* 518 c, 478 c, 479 d, 518 a. It is fantastic to see in it a reference to what Cicero calls the *lumina orationis* of Isocrates style. The rhetoric and synonyms of this passage are not to be pressed.

^b Cf. *Phileb.* 64 c ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἴδη προθύροισι, "we are now in the vestibule of the good."

^c καὶ μάλα, "jolly well," humorous emphasis on the point that it is much easier to "define" the conventional virtues than to explain the "sanction." Cf. *Symp.* 189 a, *Euthydem.* 298 d-e, Herod. viii. 66. It is frequent in the *Republic.* Ritter gives forty-seven cases. I have fifty-four! But the point that matters is the humorous tone. Cf. e.g. 610 e.

^d Excess of zeal, προθυμία, seemed laughable to the Greeks.

true opinion without intelligence differ appreciably from blind men who go the right way?" "They do not differ at all," he said. "Is it, then, ugly things that you prefer to contemplate, things blind and crooked, when you might hear from others what is luminous^a and fair?" "Nay, in heaven's name, Socrates," said Glaucon, "do not draw back, as it were, at the very goal.^b For it will content us if you explain the good even as you set forth the nature of justice, sobriety, and the other virtues." "It will right well^c content me, my dear fellow," I said, "but I fear that my powers may fail and that in my eagerness I may cut a sorry figure and become a laughing-stock.^d Nay, my beloved, let us dismiss for the time being the nature of the good in itself;^e for to attain to my present surmise of that seems a pitch above the impulse that wings my flight to-day.^f But of what seems to be the offspring of the good and most nearly made in its likeness^g I am willing to speak if you too wish it, and otherwise to let the matter drop." "Well, speak on," he said, "for you will duly pay me the tale of the parent another time." "I could wish," I said, "that I were able to make

Cf. my interpretation of *Iliad* i. in *fine*, *Class. Phil.* xxii. (1927) pp. 222-223.

^e Cf. More, *Principia Ethica*, p. 17 "Good, then, is indefinable; and yet, so far as I know, there is only one ethical writer, Professor Henry Sidgwick, who has clearly recognized and stated this fact."

^f This is not superstitious mysticism but a deliberate refusal to confine in a formula what requires either a volume or a symbol. See *Intro.* p. xxvii, and my *Idea of Good in Plato's Republic*, p. 212. τὰ νῦν repeats τὸ νῦν εἶναι (cf. *Tim.* 48 c), as the evasive phrase εἰσαῦθις below sometimes lays the topic on the table, never to be taken up again. Cf. 347 e and 430 c.

^g Cf. *Laus* 897 d-e, *Phaedr.* 246 a.

καὶ ὑμᾶς κομίσασθαι, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὥσπερ νῦν τοὺς τόκους μόνον. τοῦτον δὲ δὴ ὄν τὸν τόκον τε καὶ ἔκγονον αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ κομίσασθε. εὐλαβεῖσθε μέντοι μὴ πῆ ἔξαπατήσω ὑμᾶς ἄκων, κίβδηλον ἀποδιδούς τὸν λόγον τοῦ τόκου. Εὐλαβησόμεθα, ἔφη, κατὰ δύναμιν· ἀλλὰ μόνον λέγε. Διομολογησάμενός γ', ἔφην ἐγώ, καὶ ἀναμνήσας ὑμᾶς τὰ τ' ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ῥηθέντα καὶ ἄλλοτε ἦδη Β πολλὰκίς εἰρημένα. Τὰ ποῖα; ἦ δ' ὅς. Πολλὰ καλά, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἕκαστα οὕτως εἶναι φαμέν τε καὶ διορίζομεν τῷ λόγῳ. Φαμέν γάρ. Καὶ αὐτὸ δὴ καλὸν καὶ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ οὕτως περὶ πάντων, ἂ τότε ὡς πολλὰ ἐτίθεμεν, πάλιν αὐ κατ' ἰδέαν μίαν ἐκάστου ὡς μᾶς οὕσης τιθέντες ὁ ἔστιν ἕκαστον προσαγορεύομεν. Ἔστι ταῦτα. Καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ ὀράσθαι φαμεν, νοεῖσθαι C δ' οὐ, τὰς δ' αὖ ιδέας νοεῖσθαι μὲν, ὀράσθαι δ' οὐ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. Τῶ οὖν ὀρώμεν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὰ ὀρώμενα; Τῆ ὄψει, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἀκοῆ τὰ ἀκουόμενα, καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσι πάντα τὰ αἰσθητά; Τί μήν; Ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐννερόκας τὸν τῶν αἰσθήσεων δημιουργὸν ὄσω

^a This playful interlude relieves the monotony of argument and is a transition to the symbolism. *τόκος* means both interest and offspring. Cf. 555 E, *Polit.* 267 A, *Aristoph. Clouds* 34, *Thesm.* 845, *Pindar, Ol.* x. 12. The equivocation, which in other languages became a metaphor, has played a great part in the history of opinion about usury. Cf. the article "Usury" in Hastings's *Encyclopaedia of Relig. and Ethics*, and Antonio's

when did friendship take
A breed for barren metal of his friend?

and you to receive the payment and not merely as now the interest. But at any rate receive this interest^a and the offspring of the good. Have a care, however, lest I deceive you unintentionally with a false reckoning of the interest." "We will do our best," he said, "to be on our guard. Only speak on." "Yes," I said, "after first coming to an understanding with you and reminding you of what has been said here before and often on other occasions.^b" "What?" said he. "We predicate 'to be' of many beautiful things and many good things, saying of them severally that they *are*, and so define them in our speech." "We do." "And again, we speak of a self-beautiful and of a good that is only and merely good, and so, in the case of all the things that we then posited as many, we turn about and posit each as a single idea or aspect, assuming it to be a unity and call it that which each really is.^c" "It is so." "And the one class of things we say can be seen but not thought, while the ideas can be thought but not seen." "By all means." "With which of the parts of ourselves, with which of our faculties, then, do we see visible things?" "With sight," he said. "And do we not," I said, "hear audibles with hearing, and perceive all sensibles with the other senses?" "Surely." "Have you ever observed," said I, "how much the

^b Cf. 475 E f. Plato as often begins by a restatement of the theory of ideas, *i.e.* practically of the distinction between the concept and the objects of sense. Cf. *Rep.* 596 A ff., *Phaedo* 108 B ff.

^c The modern reader will never understand Plato from translations that talk about "Being." Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 605.

^d ὁ δ' ἔστιν is technical for the reality of the ideas. Cf. *Phaedo* 75 B, D, 78 D, *Parmen.* 129 B, *Symp.* 211 c, *Rep.* 490 B, 532 A, 597 A.

πολυτελεσάτην τὴν τοῦ ὄραν τε καὶ ὁράσθαι
 δύναμιν ἐδημιούργησεν; Οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη. Ἄλλ'
 ὦδε σκόπει. ἔστιν ὃ τι προσδεῖ ἀκοῆ καὶ φωνῆ
 γένους ἄλλου εἰς τὸ τὴν μὲν ἀκούειν, τὴν δὲ ἀκούε-
 σθαι, ὃ ἐὰν μὴ παραγένηται τρίτον, ἢ μὲν οὐκ
 ἀκούσεται, ἢ δὲ οὐκ ἀκουσθήσεται; Οὐδενός, ἔφη.
 Οἶμαι δὲ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐδ' ἄλλαις πολλαῖς, ἵνα
 μὴ εἴπω ὅτι οὐδεμιᾶ, τοιούτου προσδεῖ οὐδενός. ἢ
 σύ τινα ἔχεις εἰπεῖν; Οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἦ δ' ὅς. Τὴν
 δὲ τῆς ὄψεως καὶ τοῦ ὄρατοῦ οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ὅτι
 προσδεῖται; Πῶς; Ἐνούσης που ἐν ὄμμασιν
 ὄψεως καὶ ἐπιχειροῦντος τοῦ ἔχοντος χρῆσθαι
 αὐτῇ, παρουσίας δὲ χροᾶς ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἐὰν μὴ
 Ε παραγένηται γένος τρίτον ἰδίᾳ ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο
 πεφυκός, οἷσα, ὅτι ἢ τε ὄψις οὐδὲν ὄψεται τὰ τε
 χρώματα ἔσται ἀόρατα. Τίως δὲ λέγεις, ἔφη,
 τούτου; Ὅ δὲ σὺ καλεῖς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, φῶς.
 Ἄληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις. Οὐ μικρᾶ ἄρα ἰδέα ἢ τοῦ
 508 ὄραν αἰσθησις καὶ ἢ τοῦ ὁράσθαι δύναμις τῶν
 ἄλλων ζυζυξέων τιμωτέρῳ ζυγῷ ἐζύγησαν, εἴπερ
 μὴ ἄτιμον τὸ φῶς. Ἄλλὰ μὴν, ἔφη, πολλοῦ γε
 δεῖ ἄτιμον εἶναι.

^a Creator, δημιουργός, God, the gods, and nature, are all virtual synonyms in such passages.

^b Cf. *Phaedr.* 250 D, *Tim.* 45 B.

^c This is literature, not science. Plato knew that sound required a medium, *Tim.* 67 B. But the statement here is true enough to illustrate the thought.

^d Lit. "kind of thing," γένος. Cf. 507 C-D.

^e Cf. Troland, *The Mystery of Mind*, p. 82: "In order that there should be vision, it is not sufficient that a physical object should exist before the eyes. There must also be a source of so-called 'light.'" Cf. Sir John Davies' poem on the Soul:

greatest expenditure the creator^a of the senses has lavished on the faculty of seeing and being seen?^b "Why, no, I have not," he said. "Well, look at it thus. Do hearing and voice stand in need of another medium^c so that the one may hear and the other be heard, in the absence of which third element the one will not hear and the other not be heard?" "They need nothing," he said. "Neither, I fancy," said I, "do many others, not to say that none require anything of the sort. Or do you know of any?" "Not I," he said. "But do you not observe that vision and the visible do have this further need?" "How?" "Though vision may be in the eyes and its possessor may try to use it, and though colour be present, yet without the presence of a third thing^d specifically and naturally adapted to this purpose, you are aware that vision will see nothing and the colours will remain invisible."^e "What^f is this thing of which you speak?" he said. "The thing," I said,^g "that you call light." "You say truly," he replied. "The bond, then, that yokes together visibility and the faculty of sight is more precious by no slight form^h than that which unites the other pairs, if light is not without honour." "It surely is far from being so," he said.

But as the sharpest eye discerneth nought

Except the sunbeams in the air do shine;

So the best soul with her reflecting thought

Sees not herself without some light divine.

^f Plato would not have tried to explain this loose colloquial genitive, and we need not.

^g The loose Herodotean-Thucydidean-Isocratean use of ἰδέα. Cf. *Larous* 689 D καὶ τὸ μικρότατον εἶδος. "Form" over-translates ἰδέα here, which is little more than a synonym for γένος above. Cf. Wilamowitz, *Platon*, ii. p. 250.

XIX. Τίνα οὖν ἔχεις αἰτιάσασθαι τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ θεῶν τούτου κύριον, οὗ ἡμῶν τὸ φῶς ὅψιν τε ποιεῖ ὄραν ὅ τι κάλλιστα καὶ τὰ ὀρώμενα ὀρᾶσθαι; Ὅνπερ καὶ σύ, ἔφη, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι· τὸν ἥλιον γὰρ δῆλον ὅτι ἐρωτᾷς. Ἄρ' οὖν ὠδε πέφυκεν ὄψις πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν θεόν; Πῶς; Οὐκ ἔστιν ἥλιος ἢ ὄψις οὔτε αὐτῇ οὔτε ἐν ᾧ ἐγγίγνεται, ὃ δὲ καλοῦμεν ὄμμα. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Ἄλλ' ἡλιοειδέστατον γε ὄμαι τῶν περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ὀργάνων. Πολύ γε. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν, ἣν ἔχει, ἐκ τούτου ταμεινομένην ὥσπερ ἐπίρρυτον κέκτηται; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ ὁ ἥλιος ὄψις μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, αἴτιος δ' ὢν αὐτῆς ὀρᾶται ὑπ' αὐτῆς ταύτης;

^a Plato was willing to call the stars gods as the barbarians did (*Cratyl.* 397 D, Aristoph. *Peace* 406 ff., Herod. iv. 188). Cf. *Laws* 821 B, 899 B, 950 D, *Apol.* 26 D, *Epinomis* 985 B, 988 B.

^b Cf. my *Idea of Good in Plato's Republic*, pp. 223-225, Reinhardt, *Kosmos and Sympathie*, pp. 374-384, Arnold, "Mycerinus":

Yet, surely, O my people, did I deem
Man's justice from the all-just Gods was given;
A light that from some upper fount did beam,
Some better archetype, whose seat was heaven;
A light that, shining from the blest abodes,
Did shadow somewhat of the life of Gods.

Complete Poems of Henry More, p. 77:

Lift myself up in the Theologie
Of heavenly Plato. There I'll contemplate
The Archetype of this sunne, that bright Idee
Of steddie Good, that doth his beams dilate
Through all the worlds, all lives and beings
propagate a fair delineament

Of that which Good in Plato's school is hight,
His Tagathon with beauteous rayes bedight,

XIX. "Which one can you name of the divinities in heaven^a as the author and cause of this, whose light makes our vision see best and visible things to be seen?" "Why, the one that you too and other people mean," he said; "for your question evidently refers to the sun.^b" "Is not this, then, the relation of vision to that divinity?" "What?" "Neither vision itself nor its vehicle, which we call the eye, is identical with the sun." "Why, no." "But it is, I think, the most sunlike^c of all the instruments of sense." "By far the most." "And does it not receive the power which it possesses as an influx, as it were, dispensed from the sun?" "Certainly." "Is it not also true that the sun is not vision, yet as being the cause^d thereof

Mediaeval writers have much to say of Plato's mysterious Tagathon. Aristotle, who rejects the idea of good, uses *τάγαθον* in much the same way.

It is naïve to take the language of Platonic unction too literally. Cf. *What Plato Said*, pp. 394 ff.

^a Cf. 509 A, Plotinus, *Enn.* i. 6. 9 οὐ γὰρ ἄν πρόποτε εἶδεν ὁφθαλμὸς ἥλιον ἡλιοειδῆς μὴ γεγενημένος and vi. 7. 19, Cic. *Tusc.* i. 25. 63 *in fine* "quod si in hoc mundo fieri sine deo non potest, ne in sphaera quidem eosdem motus Archimedes sine divino ingenio potuisset imitare," Manilius ii. 115:

quis caelum posset nisi caeli munere nosse,
et reperire deum nisi qui pars ipse deorum?

Goethe's

War' nicht das Auge sonnenhaft,
Die Sonne könnt es nie erblicken,

and Goethe to Eckermann, Feb. 26, 1824: "Hätte ich nicht die Welt durch Anticipation bereits in mir getragen, ich wäre mit sehenden Augen blind geblieben."

^d Cf. *Complete Poems of Henry More*, p. 113:

Behold a fit resemblance of this truth,
The Sun begetteth both colours and sight . . . , etc.

Οὕτως, ἦ δ' ὅς. Τοῦτον τοῖνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, φάναι με λέγειν τὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔκγονον, ὃν τὰγαθὸν C ἐγέννησεν ἀνάλογον ἑαυτῷ, ὃ τι περ αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ τόπῳ πρὸς τὸ νοῦν καὶ τὰ νοούμενα, τοῦτο τοῦτον ἐν τῷ ὄρατῷ πρὸς τὸ ὄψιν καὶ τὰ ὀρώμενα. Πῶς; ἔφη· ἔτι διελθέ μοι... Ὁφθαλμοί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἷσθ' ὅτι, ὅταν μηκέτι ἐπ' ἐκεῖνά τις αὐτοὺς πρέπη ὦν ἂν τὰς χροῶς τὸ ἡμερινὸν φῶς ἐπέχη, ἀλλὰ ὦν νυκτερινὰ φέγγη, ἀμβλυώττουσί τε καὶ ἐγγὺς φαίνονται τυφλῶν, ὥσπερ οὐκ ἐνούσης καθαρᾶς ὄψεως; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Ὅταν δέ γ', D οἶμαι, ὦν ὁ ἥλιος καταλάμπει, σαφῶς ὀρώσι, καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τοῦτοις ὄμμασιν ἐνούσα φαίνεται. Τί μῆν; Οὕτω τοῖνυν καὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὧδε νόει ὅταν μὲν, οὐ καταλάμπει ἀλήθειά τε καὶ τὸ ὄν, εἰς τοῦτο ἀπέρείσθαι, ἐνόησέ τε καὶ ἔγνω αὐτὸ καὶ νοῦν ἔχεν φαίνεται· ὅταν δὲ εἰς τὸ τῷ σκότῳ κεκραμένον, τὸ γιγνώμενόν τε καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, δοξάζει τε καὶ ἀμβλυώττει ἄνω καὶ κάτω τὰς δόξας μεταβάλλον καὶ ἔουκεν αὐτὸν οὐκ ἔχοντι. E Ἔουκε γάρ. Τοῦτο τοῖνυν τὸ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρέχον τοῖς γιγνώσκομένοις καὶ τῷ γιγνώσκοντι τὴν

^a *i.e.* creation was the work of benevolent design. This is one of the few passages in the *Republic* where the idea of good is considered in relation to the universe, a thesis reserved for poetical or mythical development in the *Timaeus*. It is idle to construct a systematic metaphysical theology for Plato by identification of τὰγαθόν here either with God or

is beheld by vision itself? "That is so," he said. "This, then, you must understand that I meant by the offspring of the good^a which the good begot to stand in a proportion^b with itself: as the good is in the intelligible region to reason and the objects of reason, so is this in the visible world to vision and the objects of vision." "How is that?" he said; "explain further." "You are aware," I said, "that when the eyes are no longer turned upon objects upon whose colours the light of day falls but that of the dim luminaries of night, their edge is blunted and they appear almost blind, as if pure vision did not dwell in them." "Yes, indeed," he said. "But when, I take it, they are directed upon objects illumined by the sun, they see clearly, and vision appears to reside in these same eyes." "Certainly." "Apply this comparison to the soul also in this way. When it is firmly fixed on the domain where truth and reality shine resplendent^c it apprehends and knows them and appears to possess reason; but when it inclines to that region which is mingled with darkness, the world of becoming and passing away, it opines only and its edge is blunted, and it shifts its opinions hither and thither, and again seems as if it lacked reason." "Yes, it does." "This reality, then, that gives their truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing with the ideas as a whole. Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 512.

^b Cf. *Gorg.* 465 B-C, *infra* 510 A-B, 511 E, 530 D, 534 A, 576 C, *Phaedo* 111 A-B, *Tim.* 29 C, 32 A-B. For ἀνάλογον in this sense cf. 511 E, 534 A, *Phaedo* 110 D.

^c Plato's rhetoric is not to be pressed. Truth, being, the good, are virtual synonyms. Still, for Plato's ethical and political philosophy the light that makes things intelligible is the idea of good, *i.e.* the "sanction," and not, as some commentators insist, the truth.

δύναμιν ἀποδιδόν τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν φάθι εἶναι, αὐτίαν δ' ἐπιστήμης οὖσαν καὶ ἀληθείας ὡς γυγνωσκομένης μὲν διανοοῦ, οὕτω δὲ καλῶν ἀμφοτέρων ὄντων, γνώσεώς τε καὶ ἀληθείας, ἄλλο καὶ κάλλιον ἔτι τούτων ἡγούμενος αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς ἡγήσει· ἐπιστήμην δὲ καὶ ἀλήθειαν, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ φῶς τε καὶ ὄψιν ἡλιοειδῆ μὲν νομίζεν ὀρθόν, ἥλιον δὲ ἡγείσθαι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀγαθοειδῆ μὲν νομίζεν ταῦτ' ἀμφοτέρα ὀρθόν, ἀγαθὸν δὲ ἡγείσθαι ὀπότερον αὐτῶν οὐκ ὀρθόν, ἀλλ' ἔτι μειζόνως τιμητέον τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔξιν. Ἀμήχανον κάλλος, ἔφη, λέγεις, εἰ ἐπιστήμην μὲν καὶ ἀλήθειαν παρέχει, αὐτὸ δ' ὑπὲρ ταῦτα κάλλει ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ δήπου σύ γε ἡδονὴν αὐτὸ

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^a No absolute distinction can be drawn between εἶδος and ἰδέα in Plato. But ἰδέα may be used to carry the notion of "apprehended aspect" which I think is more pertinent here than the metaphysical entity of the idea, though of course Plato would affirm that. Cf. 369 A, *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 35, *What Plato Said*, p. 585, *Class. Phil.* xx. (1925) p. 347.

^b The meaning is clear. We really understand and know anything only when we apprehend its purpose, the aspect of the good that it reveals. Cf. *Introd.* pp. xxxv-xxxvi. The position and case of γυγνωσκομένης are difficult. But no change proposed is any improvement.

^c Plato likes to cap a superlative by a further degree of completeness, a climax beyond the climax. Cf. 405 B αἰσχίστον . . . αἰσχίον, 578 B, *Symp.* 180 A-B and Bury *ad loc.* The same characteristic can be observed in his method, e.g. in the *Symposium* where Agathon's speech, which seems the climax, is surpassed by that of Socrates; similarly in the *Gorgias* and the tenth book of the *Republic*. Cf. Friedländer, *Platon*, i. p. 174, *supra* *Introd.* p. lxi.

This and the next half page belong, I think, to rhetoric rather than to systematic metaphysics. Plato the idealist uses transcendental language of his ideal, and is never willing

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to the knower, you must say is the idea ^a of good, and you must conceive it as being the cause of knowledge, and of truth in so far as known. ^b Yet fair as they both are, knowledge and truth, in supposing it to be something fairer still ^c than these you will think rightly of it. But as for knowledge and truth, even as in our illustration it is right to deem light and vision sunlike, but never to think that they are the sun, so here it is right to consider these two their counterparts, as being like the good or boniform, ^d but to think that either of them is the good ^e is not right. Still higher honour belongs to the possession and habit ^f of the good. "An inconceivable beauty you speak of," he said, "if it is the source of knowledge and truth, and yet itself surpasses them in beauty. For you surely ^g cannot mean that it is pleasure." "Hush,"

to admit that expression has done justice to it. But Plato the rationalist distinctly draws the line between his religious language thrown out at an object and his definite logical and practical conclusions. Cf. e.g. *Meno* 81 D-E.

^a ἀγαθοειδῆ occurs only here in classical Greek literature. Plato quite probably coined it for his purpose.

^b There is no article in the Greek. Plato is not scrupulous to distinguish good and the good here. Cf. on 505 c, p. 89, note *f*.

^c ἔξιν is not yet in Plato quite the technical Aristotelian "habit." However *Protag.* 344 c approaches it. Cf. also *Phileb.* 11 D, 41 c, Ritter-Preller, p. 285.

Plato used many words in periphrasis with the genitive, e.g. ἔξιν *Laws* 625 c, γένεαι *Laws* 691 B, *Tim.* 73 B, 76 E, μοῖρα *Phaedr.* 255 B, 274 E, *Menex.* 249 B, φῶρις *Phaedo* 109 E, *Symp.* 186 B, *Laws* 729 c, 845 D, 944 D, etc. He may have chosen ἔξιν here to suggest the ethical aspect of the good as a habit or possession of the soul. The introduction of ἡδονή below supports this view. Some interpreters think it = τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὡς ἔχει, which is possible but rather pointless.

^d For οὐ γὰρ δήπου cf. *Apol.* 20 c, *Gorg.* 455 A, *Euthyphr.* 13 A.

λέγεις. Εὐφήμει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἀλλ' ὦδε μάλλον
 Β τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ ἔπι ἐπισκόπει. Πῶς; Τὸν
 ἦλλον τοῖς ὀρωμένοις οὐ μόνον, οἶμαι, τὴν τοῦ
 ὀρασθαι δύναμιν παρέχεν φήσεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν
 γένεσιν καὶ αὐξήν· καὶ τροφήν, οὐ γένεσιν αὐτὸν
 ὄντα. Πῶς γάρ; Καὶ τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις τοῖν
 μὴ μόνον τὸ γιγνώσκεισθαι φάναί ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ
 παρεῖναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναι τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπ'
 ἐκείνου αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι, οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ
 ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔπι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρῆβεία
 καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος.

С XX. Καὶ ὁ Γλαῦκων μάλα γελοῖως, "Απολλων,
 ἔφη, δαιμονίας ὑπερβολῆς! Σὺ γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,
 αἴτιος, ἀναγκάζων τὰ ἐμοὶ δοκούντα περὶ αὐτοῦ
 λέγειν. Καὶ μηδαμῶς γ', ἔφη, παύσῃ, εἰ μὴ τι
 ἀλλὰ τὴν περὶ τὸν ἦλιον ὁμοίότητα αὐ διεξίω, εἴ
 πη ἀπολείπεις. Ἀλλὰ μήν, εἶπον, συχνά γε ἀπο-

^a i.e. not only do we understand a thing when we know its purpose, but a purpose in some mind is the chief cause of its existence, God's mind for the universe, man's mind for political institutions. This, being the only interpretation that makes sense of the passage, is presumably more or less consciously Plato's meaning. Cf. *Introd.* pp. xxxv-xxxvi.

Quite irrelevant are Plato's supposed identification of the ἀγαθόν with the ἐν, one, and Aristotle's statement, *Met.* 988 a, that the ideas are the cause of other things and the one is the cause of the ideas.

The remainder of the paragraph belongs to transcendental rhetoric. It has been endlessly quoted and plays a great part in Neoplatonism, in all philosophies of the unknowable and in all negative and mystic theologies.

^b It is an error to oppose Plato here to the Alexandrians who sometimes said ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὄντος. Plato's sentence would have made ὄντος very inconvenient here. But εἶναι shows that οὐσίας is not distinguished from τοῦ ὄντος here; ἐπέκεινα became technical and a symbol for the transcendental

said I, "but examine the similitude of it still further in this way.^a" "How?" "The sun, I presume you will say, not only furnishes to visibles the power of visibility but it also provides for their generation and growth and nurture though it is not itself generation."^b Of course not." "In like manner, then, you are to say that the objects of knowledge not only receive from the presence of the good their being known, but their very existence and essence is derived to them from it, though the good itself is not essence but still transcends essence^b in dignity and surpassing power."

XX. And Glaucon very ludicrously^c said, "Heaven save us, hyperbole^d can no further go." "The fault is yours," I said, "for compelling me to utter my thoughts about it." "And don't desist," he said, "but at least^e expound the similitude of the sun, if there is anything that you are omitting." "Why, certainly," I said, "I am omitting a great deal." "Well,

in Neoplatonism and all similar philosophies. Cf. Plotinus xvii. 1, Dionysius Areop. *De divinis nominibus*, ii. 2, Friedländer, *Platon*, i. p. 87.

^c He is amused at Socrates' emphasis. Fanciful is Wilamowitz' notion (*Platon*, i. p. 209) that the laughable thing is Glaucon's losing control of himself, for which he compares Aristoph. *Birds* 61. Cf. the extraordinary comment of Proclus, p. 265.

The dramatic humour of Glaucon's surprise is Plato's way of smiling at himself, as he frequently does in the dialogues. Cf. 536 B, 540 B, *Lysis* 223 B, *Protag.* 340 E, *Charm.* 175 E, *Cratyl.* 426 B, *Theaet.* 200 B, 197 D, etc. Cf. Friedländer, *Platon*, i. p. 172 on the *Phaedo*.

^d "What a comble!" would be nearer the tone of the Greek. There is no good English equivalent for ὑπερβολῆς. Cf. Sir Thomas Browne's remark that "nothing can be said hyperbolically of God." The banter here relieves the strain, as is Plato's manner.

^e Cf. 502 A, *Symp.* 222 E, *Meno* 86 E.

don't omit the least bit," he said. "I fancy," I said, "that I shall have to pass over much, but nevertheless so far as it is at present practicable I shall not willingly leave anything out." "Do not," he said. "Conceive then," said I, "as we were saying, that there are these two entities, and that one of them is sovereign over the intelligible order and region and the other over the world of the eye-ball, not to say the sky-ball,^a but let that pass. You surely apprehend the two types, the visible and the intelligible." "I do." "Represent them then, as it were, by a line divided^b into two unequal^c sections and cut each section again in the same ratio (the section, that is, of the visible and that of the intelligible order), and then as an expression of the ratio of their comparative clearness and obscurity you will have, as one of the sections of the visible world, images.^d By images^d I mean, first, shadows, and then reflections in water and on surfaces of dense, smooth and bright texture, and everything of that kind, if you apprehend." "I do." "As the second section assume that of which this is a likeness or an image, that is, the animals about us and all plants and the whole class of objects made by man." "I so assume it," he said. "Would you be willing to say," said I, "that the division in respect of reality and truth or the opposite is expressed by the proportion:^e as is the opinable to the knowable so is the likeness to that of which it is a likeness?" "I certainly would." "Consider then again the way in which we are to make the division of the intelligible section." "In what way?" little more plausible to make the sections unequal. But again there is doubt which shall be longer, the higher as the more honourable or the lower as the more multitudinous. Cf. *Plat. Quest. 3.*
^a Cf. *supra* 402 B, *Soph.* 266 n-c.
^b Cf. *supra* on 508 c, p. 103, note b.

λείπω. Μηδὲ μικρὸν τοῖνυν, ἔφη, παραλίπη. Οἷμαι μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ πολὺ ὅμως δέ, ὅσα γ' ἐν τῷ παρόντι δυνατὸν, ἐκὼν οὐκ ἀπολείψω. Μὴ γάρ, ἔφη. Νόησον τοῖνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, δύο αὐτῶ εἶναι, καὶ βασιλεύειν τὸ μὲν νοητοῦ γένους τε καὶ τόπου, τὸ δ' αὖ ὄρατου, ἵνα μὴ οὐρανοῦ εἰπὼν δόξω σοι σοφίζεσθαι περὶ τὸ ὄνομα. ἀλλ' οὖν ἔχεις ταῦτα διττὰ εἶδη, ὄρατόν, νοητόν; Ἐχῶ. Ὡσπερ τοῖνυν γραμμὴν δέχα τετμημένην λαβὼν ἄνισα¹ τμήματα, πάλιν τέμνε ἐκάτερον τμήμα ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, τό τε τοῦ ὄρωμένου γένους καὶ τὸ τοῦ νοουμένου, καὶ σοὶ ἔσται σαφηνεῖα καὶ ἀσαφεία πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐν μὲν Εἰ τῷ ὄρωμένῳ τὸ μὲν ἕτερον τμήμα εἰκόνας. λέγω 510 δὲ τὰς εἰκόνας πρῶτον μὲν τὰς σκιὰς, ἔπειτα τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι φαντάσματα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὅσα πυκνά τε καὶ λεῖα καὶ φανὰ ζυγέστηκε, καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον, εἰ κατανοεῖς. Ἀλλὰ κατανοῶ. Τὸ τοιοῦτον ἕτερον τίθει ᾧ τοῦτο ἔοικε, τὰ τε περὶ ἡμᾶς ζῶα καὶ πᾶν τὸ φυτευτὸν καὶ τὸ σκευαστὸν ὅλον γένος. Τίθημι, ἔφη. Ἡ καὶ ἐθέλοισ ἂν αὐτὸ φάναι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δηρῆσθαι ἀληθεία τε καὶ μὴ, ὡς τὸ δοξαστὸν πρὸς τὸ γνωστὸν, οὕτω τὸ ὁμοιωθὲν Β πρὸς τὸ ᾧ ὁμοιωθή; Ἐργῶν, ἔφη, καὶ μάλα. Σκόπει δὴ αὖ καὶ τὴν τοῦ νοητοῦ τομὴν ἢ τμητέον.
¹ ἄνισα ADM Proclus, ἄν, ἴσα F, ἄν ἴσα Stallbaum.

^a Cf. the similar etymological pun in *Cratyl.* 396 b-c. Here, as often, the translator must choose between over-translating for some tastes, or not translating at all.

^b The meaning is given in the text. Too many commentators lose the meaning in their study of the imagery. Cf. the notes of Adam, Jowett, Campbell, and Apelt. See *Introd.* p. xxxi for my interpretation of the passage.

^c Some modern and ancient critics prefer ἄν ἴσα. It is a

Πῆ; Ἡὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ τοῖς τότε τμηθείσιν¹ ὡς εἰκόσι χρωμένη ψυχῇ ζητεῖν ἀναγκάζεται ἐξ ὑποθέσεων, οὐκ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν πορευομένη, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τελευτῆν, τὸ δ' αὖ ἔτερον ἐπ'² ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἰοῦσα καὶ ἄνευ ὄντων ἐκείνου εἰκόνων αὐτοῖς εἶδει δι' αὐτῶν τὴν μέθοδον ποιομένη. Ταῦτ', ἔφη, ἃ λέγεις, οὐχ ἰκανῶς ἔμαθον. Ἄλλ' Ο αἴθις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ῥῆον γὰρ τούτων προειρημένων μαθήσει. οἶμαι γάρ σε εἰδέναι, ὅτι οἱ περὶ τὰς γεωμετρίας τε καὶ λογισμοῦς καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πραγματευόμενοι, ὑποθέμενοι τό τε περιττὸν καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ γωνιῶν τριττὰ εἶδη καὶ ἄλλα τούτων ἀδελφὰ καθ' ἑκάστην μέθοδον, ταῦτα μὲν ὡς εἰδότες, ποιησάμενοι ὑποθέσεις αὐτά, οὐδένα λόγον οὔτε αὐτοῖς οὔτε ἄλλοις ἐπι ἀξιοῦσι περὶ αὐτῶν διδόναι ὡς παντὶ φανερών, ἐκ τούτων δ' ἀρχόμενοι τὰ λοιπὰ ἤδη διεξιόντες τελευτῶσιν ὁμολογουμένως ἐπὶ τούτο, οὐδ' ἂν ἐπὶ σκέψῃ ὀρμησῶσιν. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε οἶδα. Οὐκ-

¹ τμηθείσιν DM, μιμηθείσιν A Proclus, τμηθείσιν F.
² [τὸ] ἐπ' Ast.

^a Cf. my *Idea of Good in Plato's Republic*, pp. 230-234, for the ἀνυπόθετον. Ultimately, the ἀνυπόθετον is the Idea of Good so far as we assume that idea to be attainable either in ethics or in physics. But it is the Idea of Good, not as a transcendental ontological mystery, but in the ethical sense already explained. The ideal dialectician is the man who can, if challenged, run his reasons for any given proposition back, not to some assumed *axioma medium*, but to its relation to ultimate Good. To call the ἀνυπόθετον the Unconditioned or the Absolute introduces metaphysical associations foreign to the passage. Cf. also *Introduct.* pp. xxxiii-xxxiv.

^b The practical meaning of this is independent of the disputed metaphysics. Cf. *Introduct.* pp. xvi-xviii.

“By the distinction that there is one section of it which the soul is compelled to investigate by treating as images the things imitated in the former division, and by means of assumptions from which it proceeds not up to a first principle but down to a conclusion, while there is another section in which it advances from its assumption to a beginning or principle that transcends assumption,^a and in which it makes no use of the images employed by the other section, relying on ideas^b only and progressing systematically through ideas.” “I don't fully understand^c what you mean by this,” he said. “Well, I will try again,” said I, “for you will better understand after this preamble. For I think you are aware that students of geometry and reckoning and such subjects first postulate the odd and the even and the various figures and three kinds of angles and other things akin to these in each branch of science, regard them as known, and, treating them as absolute assumptions, do not deign to render any further account of them^d to themselves or others, taking it for granted that they are obvious to everybody. They take their start from these, and pursuing the inquiry from this point on consistently, conclude with that for the investigation of which they set out.” “Certainly,” he said, “I know that.”

^c Cf. Vol. I. p. 79, note *c* on 347^a and p. 47, note *f* on 338^d; *What Plato Said*, p. 503 on *Gorg.* 463^d.

^d *Aristot. Top.* 100^b 2-3 οὐ δέει γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστημονικαῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐπιγυρεύθαι τὸ διὰ τί, exactly expresses Plato's thought and the truth, though Aristotle may have meant it mainly for the principle of non-contradiction and other first principles of logic. Cf. the mediaeval “contra principium negantem non est disputandum.” A teacher of geometry will refuse to discuss the psychology of the idea of space, a teacher of chemistry will not permit the class to ask whether matter is “real.”

οὐν καὶ ὅτι τοῖς ὀρωμένοις εἶδεσι προσχρῶνται καὶ τοὺς λόγους περὶ αὐτῶν ποιῶνται, οὐ περὶ τούτων διανοούμενοι, ἀλλ' ἐκείνων περί, οἷς ταῦτα ἔοικε, τοῦ τετραγώνου αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα τοὺς λόγους ποιούμενοι καὶ διαμέτρου αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' οὐ ταύτης ἦν γράφουσι, καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτως, αὐτὰ μὲν ταῦτα, ἃ πλάττουσὶ τε καὶ γράφουσιν, ὧν καὶ σκιαὶ καὶ ἐν ὕδασι εἰκόνες εἰσὶ, τούτοις μὲν ὡς εἰκόσων αὐτῶν χρώμενοι, ζητοῦντες δὲ αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα ἰδεῖν, ἃ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἴδοι τις ἢ τῇ διανοίᾳ. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

XXI. Τοῦτο τοῖνυν νοητὸν μὲν τὸ εἶδος ἔλεγον, ὑποθέσει δ' ἀναγκαζομένην ψυχὴν χρῆσθαι περὶ τὴν ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ, οὐκ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἰοῦσαν, ὡς οὐ δυναμένη τῶν ὑποθέσεων ἀνωτέρω ἐκβαίνειν, εἰκόσα δὲ χρωμένην αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπεικασθεῖσι καὶ ἐκείνοις πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ὡς ἐναργέσι δεδοξασμένοις τε καὶ περιηγημένοις. Μανθάνω, Β ἔφη, ὅτι τὸ ὑπὸ ταῖς γεωμετρίας τε καὶ ταῖς ταύτης ἀδελφαῖς τέχναις λέγεις. Τὸ τοῖνυν ἔτερον μάνθανε τμήμα τοῦ νοητοῦ λέγοντά με τοῦτο, οὐ αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος ἀπτεται τῇ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνάμει,

^a Cf. 527 a-b. This explanation of mathematical reasoning does not differ at all from that of Aristotle and Berkeley and the moderns who praise Aristotle, except that the metaphysical doctrine of ideas is in the background to be asserted if challenged.

^b i.e. a bronze sphere would be the original of its imitative reflection in water, but it is in turn only the imperfect imitation of the mathematical idea of a sphere.

^c Stenzel, *Handbuch*, 118 "das er nur mit dem Verstande (διανοίᾳ) sieht" is mistaken. *διανοία* is used not in its special sense ("understanding." See p. 116, note c), but generally for the mind as opposed to the senses. Cf. 511 c.

^d For the concessive μὲν cf. 546 E, 529 D, *Soph.* 225 c.

"And do you not also know that they further make use of the visible forms and talk about them, though they are not thinking of them but of those things of which they are a likeness, pursuing their inquiry for the sake of the square as such and the diagonal as such, and not for the sake of the image of it which they draw ^a? And so in all cases. The very things which they mould and draw, which have shadows and images of themselves in water, these things they treat in their turn ^b as only images, but what they really seek is to get sight of those realities which can be seen only by the mind.^c" "True," he said.

XXI. "This then is the class that I described as intelligible, it is true,^d but with the reservation first that the soul is compelled to employ assumptions in the investigation of it, not proceeding to a first principle because of its inability to extricate itself from and rise above its assumptions, and second, that it uses as images or likenesses the very objects that are themselves copied and adumbrated by the class below them, and that in comparison with these latter ^e are esteemed as clear and held in honour.^f" "I understand," said he, "that you are speaking of what falls under geometry and the kindred arts." "Understand then," said I, "that by the other section of the intelligible I mean that which the reason ^g itself lays hold of by the power of dialectics,^h treating its

^e The loosely appended dative ἐκείνοις is virtually a dative absolute. Cf. *Phaedo* 105 A. Willamowitz' emendation (*Platon*, ii. p. 384) το πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, καὶ ἐκείνοις rests on a misunderstanding of the passage.

^f The translation of this sentence is correct. But cf. Adam *ad loc.*

^g λόγος here suggests both the objective personified argument and the subjective faculty.

^h Cf. 533 A. *Philob.* 57 E.

τὰς ὑποθέσεις ποιούμενος οὐκ ἀρχάς, ἀλλὰ τῶ ὄντι ὑποθέσεις, οἷον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὀρμάς, ἵνα μέχρι τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὴν ἴων, ἀβιάμενος αὐτῆς, πάλιν αὐτὸν ἐχόμενος τῶν ἐκείνης ἐχομένων, οὕτως ἐπὶ τελευτῆν καταβαίῃ, C αἰσθητῶ παντάπασιν οὐδενὶ προσχωρούμενος, ἀλλ' εἶδεν αὐτοῖς δι' αὐτῶν εἰς αὐτὰ, καὶ τελευτᾶ εἰς εἶδη. Μανθάνω, ἔφη, ἱκανῶς μὲν οὐ—δοκεῖς γάρ μοι συχρὸν ἔργον λέγειν—ὅτι μέντοι βούλει δι- ορίξεν σαφέστερον εἶναι τὸ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιστήμης τοῦ ὄντος τε καὶ νοητοῦ θεωρούμενον ἢ τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν καλουμένων, αἷς αἱ ὑπο- θέσεις ἀρχαὶ καὶ διανοία μὲν ἀναγκάζονται ἀλλὰ μὴ D αἰσθήσεσιν αὐτὰ θεᾶσθαι οἱ θεώμενοι, διὰ δὲ τὸ μὴ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἀνελθόντες σκοπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὑπο- θέσεων, νοῦν οὐκ ἴσχειν περὶ αὐτὰ δοκοῦσί σοι,

^a τῶ ὄντι emphasizes the etymological meaning of the word. Similarly ἐς ἀληθείας in 551 ε, *Phaedo* 80 ε, *Phileb.* 64 ε. For hypotheses cf. Burnet, *Greek Philosophy*, p. 229, Thompson on *Meno* 86 ε. But the thing to note is that the word according to the context may emphasize the arbitrariness of an assumption or the fact that it is the starting-point—ἀρχή—of the inquiry.

^b Cf. *Symp.* 211 c ὡσπερ ἐπαραβάσιμος, "like steps of a stair."

^c παντὸς ἀρχὴν taken literally lends support to the view that Plato is thinking of an absolute first principle. But in spite of the metaphysical suggestions for practical purposes the παντὸς ἀρχή may be the virtual equivalent of the ἱκανῶν of the *Phaedo*. It is the ἀρχή on which all in the particular case depends and is reached by dialectical agreement, not by arbitrary assumption. Cf. on 510 ε, p. 110, note α.

assumptions not as absolute beginnings but literally as hypotheses,^a underpinnings, footings,^b and springboards so to speak, to enable it to rise to that which requires no assumption and is the starting-point of all,^c and after attaining to that again taking hold of the first dependencies from it, so to proceed downward to the conclusion, making no use whatever of any object of sense^d but only of pure ideas moving on through ideas to ideas and ending with ideas.^e "I understand," he said; "not fully, for it is no slight task that you appear to have in mind, but I do understand that you mean to distinguish the aspect of reality and the intelligible, which is contemplated by the power of dialectic, as something truer and more exact than the object of the so-called arts and sciences whose assumptions are arbitrary starting-points. And though it is true that those who contemplate them are compelled to use their understanding^f and not their senses, yet because they do not go back to the beginning in the study of them but start from assumptions you do not think they possess true

^a This is one of the passages that are misused to attribute to Plato disdain for experience and the perceptions of the senses. Cf. on 530 ε, p. 187, note c. The dialectician is able to reason purely in concepts and words without recurring to images. Plato is not here considering how much or little of his knowledge is ultimately derived from experience.

^e The description undoubtedly applies to a metaphysical philosophy that deduces all things from a transcendent first principle. I have never denied that. The point of my interpretation is that it also describes the method which distinguishes the dialectician as such from the man of science, and that this distinction is for practical and educational purposes the chief result of the discussion, as Plato virtually says in the next few lines. Cf. *What Plato Said*, pp. 233-234. ^f διαβολή here as in 511 α is general and not technical.

καίτοι νοητῶν ὄντων μετὰ ἀρχῆς. δianoian δὲ καλεῖν μοι δοκεῖς τὴν τῶν γεωμετρικῶν τε καὶ τὴν τῶν ποιούτων ἔξιν ἄλλ' οὐ νοῦν, ὡς μεταξὺ πιδόξης τε καὶ νοῦ τὴν δianoian οὔσαν. Ἰκανώτατα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀπεδέξω. καὶ μοι ἐπὶ τοῖς τέτταρσι τμήμασι τέτταρα ταῦτα παθήματα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γιγνώμενα λαβέ, νόησιν μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀνωτάτῳ, E δianoian δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ δευτέρῳ, τῷ τρίτῳ δὲ πίστιν ἀπόδος καὶ τῷ τελευταίῳ εἰκασίαν, καὶ τάξον αὐτὰ ἀνὰ λόγον, ὥσπερ ἐφ' οἷς ἔστιν ἀληθείας μετέχευ, οὕτω ταῦτα σαφηνείας ἠγησάμενος μετέχευ. Μανθάνω, ἔφη, καὶ ξυγχωρῶ καὶ τάττω ὡς λέγεις.

^a νοῦν οὐκ ἴσχευν is perhaps intentionally ambiguous. Colloquially the phrase means "have no sense." For its higher meaning cf. *Meno* 99 c, *Laws* 962 A.

^b Unnecessary difficulties have been raised about καίτοι and μετὰ here. Wilamowitz, *Platon*, ii. p. 345 mistakenly resorts to emendation. The meaning is plain. Mathematical ideas are ideas or concepts like other ideas; but the mathematician does not deal with them quite as the dialectician deals with ideas and therefore does not possess νοῦς or reason in the highest sense.

^c Here the word δianoia is given a technical meaning as a

intelligence^a about them although^b the things themselves are intelligibles when apprehended in conjunction with a first principle. And I think you call the mental habit of geometers and their like mind or understanding^c and not reason because you regard understanding as something intermediate between opinion and reason." "Your interpretation is quite sufficient," I said; "and now, answering to^d these four sections, assume these four affections occurring in the soul: intellection or reason for the highest, understanding for the second; assign belief^e to the third, and to the last picture-thinking or conjecture,^f and arrange them in a proportion,^g considering that they participate in clearness and precision in the same degree as their objects partake of truth and reality." "I understand," he said; "I concur and arrange them as you bid."

faculty inferior to νοῦς, but, as Plato says, the terminology does not matter. The question has been much and often idly discussed.

^d For ἐπι cf. *Polit.* 280 A, *Gorg.* 463 B.

^e πίστις is of course not "faith" in Plato, but Neoplatonists, Christians, and commentators have confused the two ideas hopelessly.

^f εἰκασία undoubtedly had this connotation for Plato.
^g Cf. on 508 c, p. 103, note b.

514 I. Μετὰ ταῦτα δὴ, εἶπον, ἀπέικασον τοιοῦτῶ πάθει τὴν ἡμετέραν φύσιν παιδείας τε πέρι καὶ ἀπαιδευσίας. ἰδὲ γὰρ ἀνθρώπους οἷον ἐν καταγείῳ οἰκίσει σπηλαιώδει, ἀναπεπταμένην πρὸς τὸ φῶς τὴν εἴσοδον ἔχουσα μακρὰν παρ' ἅπαν τὸ σπήλαιον, ἐν ταύτῃ ἐκ παίδων ὄντας ἐν δεσμοῖς

^a The image of the cave illustrates by another proportion the contrast between the world of sense-perception and the world of thought. Instead of going above the plane of ordinary experience for the other two members of the proportion, Plato here goes below and invents a fire and shadows cast from it on the walls of a cave to correspond to the sun and the "real" objects of sense. In such a proportion our "real" world becomes the symbol of Plato's ideal world.

Modern fancy may read what meanings it pleases into the Platonic antithesis of the "real" and the "ideal." It has even been treated as an anticipation of the fourth dimension. But Plato never leaves an attentive and critical reader in doubt as to his own intended meaning. There may be at the most a little uncertainty as to which precise traits are intended to carry the symbolism and which are merely indispensable parts of the picture.

The source and first suggestion of Plato's imagery is an interesting speculation, but it is of no significance for the interpretation of the thought. Cf. John Henry Wright, "The Origin of Plato's Cave" in *Harvard Studies in Class. Phil.* xvii. (1906) pp. 130-142. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, pp. 89-90, thinks the allegory Orphic. Cf. also Wright, *loc. cit.* pp. 134-135. Empedocles likens our world

I. "Next," said I, "compare our nature in respect of education and its lack to such an experience as this. Picture men dwelling in a sort of subterranean cavern^a with a long entrance open^b to the light on its entire width. Conceive them as having their legs and necks fettered^c from childhood, so that they to a cave, Diels i.³ 269. Cf. Wright, *loc. cit.* Wright refers it to the Cave of Vari in Attica, pp. 140-142. Others have supposed that Plato had in mind rather the puppet and marionette shows to which he refers. Cf. Diès in *Bulletin Budé*, No. 14 (1927) pp. 8 f.

The suggestiveness of the image has been endless. The most eloquent and frequently quoted passage of Aristotle's early writings is derived from it, Cic. *De nat. deor.* ii. 37. It is the source of Bacon's "idols of the den." Sir Thomas Browne writes in *Urn Burial*: "We yet discourse in Plato's den and are but embryo philosophers." Huxley's allegory of "Jack and the Beanstalk" in *Evolution and Ethics*, pp. 47 ff. is a variation on it. Berkeley recurs to it, *Siris*, § 263. The Freudians would have still more fantastic interpretations. Cf. Jung, *Analytic Psych.* p. 232. Eddington perhaps glances at it when he attributes to the new physics the frank realization that physical science is concerned with a world of shadows. Cf. also *Complete Poems of Henry More* (ed. Grossart), p. 44:

Like men new made contriv'd into a cave
That ne'er saw light, but in that shadowy pit
Some uncouth might them hoodwink hither drave, etc.

^b Cf. *Phaedo* 111 c ἀναπεπταμένους.
^c Cf. *Phaedo* 67 d.

καὶ τὰ σκέλη καὶ τοὺς αὐχένας, ὥστε μένειν τε
 B αὐτοῦ¹ εἰς τε τὸ πρόσθεν μόνον ὄραν, κύκλω δὲ
 τὰς κεφαλὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσμοῦ ἀδυνάτους περιάγειν,
 φῶς δὲ αὐτοῖς πυρὸς ἄνωθεν καὶ πόρρωθεν καό-
 μενον ὄπισθεν αὐτῶν, μεταξύ δὲ τοῦ πυρὸς καὶ
 τῶν δεσμοτῶν ἐπάνω ὁδόν, παρ' ἣν ἰδὲ τεχνίον
 παρωκοδομημένον, ὥσπερ τοῖς θαυμαστοῖσι πρὸ
 τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρόκειται τὰ παραφράγματα, ὑπὲρ
 ὧν τὰ θαύματα δεικνύασιν. Ὅρῶ, ἔφη. Ὅρα
 τοῖσιν παρὰ τοῦτο τὸ τεχνίον φέροντας ἀνθρώπους
 σκευή τε παντοδαπὰ ὑπερέχοντα τοῦ τεχνίου καὶ
 515 ἀνδριάντας καὶ ἄλλα ζῶα λίθινά τε καὶ ξύλινα καὶ
 παντοῖα ἐργασμένα, οἷον εἰκὸς τοὺς μὲν φθει-
 γομένους, τοὺς δὲ σιγῶντας τῶν παραφερόντων.
 Ἄστοπον, ἔφη, λέγεις εἰκόνα καὶ δεσμώτας ἀτό-
 πους. Ὅμοίους ἦμῶν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· τοὺς γὰρ τοιού-
 τους πρῶτον μὲν ἑαυτῶν τε καὶ ἀλλήλων οἶει ἂν τι
 ἑωρακεῖναι ἄλλο πλὴν τὰς σκιὰς τὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς
 εἰς τὸ καταντικρὺ αὐτῶν τοῦ σπηλαίου προσ-
 πιπτούσας; Πῶς γάρ, ἔφη, εἰ ἀκινήτους γε τὰς
 B κεφαλὰς ἔχουν ἠραγκασμένοι εἶεν διὰ βίου; Τί δὲ
 τῶν παραφερομένων; οὐ ταῦτόν τοῦτο. Τί μήν;
 Eἰ ὅν διαλέγεσθαι οἶοί τ' εἶεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, οὐ
 ταῦτα² ἦγε ἂν τὰ παριόντα³ αὐτοὺς νομίζεν ὀνομά-

¹ αὐτοῦ Hirschig; αὐτοῦς.

² οὐ ταῦτα D, οὐ ταῦτά AFM, οὐκ αὐτὰ ci. Vermehren.

³ παριόντα scilicet, παρόντα AFDM, ὄντα Iamblichus.

remain in the same spot, able to look forward only, and prevented by the fetters from turning their heads. Picture further the light from a fire burning higher up and at a distance behind them, and between the fire and the prisoners and above them a road along which a low wall has been built, as the exhibitors of puppet-shows^a have partitions before the men themselves, above which they show the puppets." "All that I see," he said. "See also, then, men carrying^b past the wall implements of all kinds that rise above the wall, and human images and shapes of animals as well, wrought in stone and wood and every material, some of these bearers presumably speaking and others silent." "A strange image you speak of," he said, "and strange prisoners." "Like to us," I said; "for, to begin with, tell me do you think that these men would have seen anything of themselves or of one another except the shadows cast from the fire on the wall of the cave that fronted them?" "How could they," he said, "if they were compelled to hold their heads unmoved through life?" "And again, would not the same be true of the objects carried past them?" "Surely." "If then they were able to talk to one another, do you not think that they would suppose that in naming the things

^a H. Rackham, *Class. Rev.* xxix. pp. 77-78, suggests that the τοῖς θαυμαστοῖσι should be translated "at the marionettes" and be classed with *καυοῖς τραγυφοῖς* (*Pseph. op. Dem.* xviii. 116). For the dative he refers to Kuehner-Gerth, *ii.* i. p. 445.

^b The men are merely a part of the necessary machinery of the image. Their shadows are not cast on the wall. The artificial objects correspond to the things of sense and opinion in the divided line, and the shadows to the world of reflections, *εἰκόνας*,

ζεν ἄπερ ὀρφεν; Ἀνάγκη. Τί δ'; εἰ καὶ ἡχώ
 τὸ δεσμωτήριον ἐκ τοῦ καταντικρὺ ἔχοι, ὅποτε τις
 τῶν παριόντων φθέγγεται, οἷε ἂν ἄλλο τι αὐτοὺς
 ἡγέσθαι τὸ φθεγγόμενον ἢ τὴν παριούσαν σκιάν;
 Μὰ Δι' οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη. Παντάπασι δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,
 C οἱ τοιοῦτοι οὐκ ἂν ἄλλο τι νομίζοιεν τὸ ἀληθές ἢ
 τὰς τῶν σκευαστῶν σκιὰς. Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.
 Σκόπει δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αὐτῶν λύσων τε καὶ ἴσων
 τῶν δεσμῶν καὶ τῆς ἀφροσύνης, οἷα τις ἂν εἴη, εἰ
 φύσει τοιάδε ξυμβαίνοι αὐτοῖς· ὅποτε τις λυθείη
 καὶ ἀναγκάζοιτο ἐξαίφνης ἀνίστασθαι τε καὶ περι-
 άγειν τὸν αὐχένα καὶ βαδίζειν καὶ πρὸς τὸ φῶς
 ἀναβλέπειν, πάντα δὲ ταῦτα ποιῶν ἀλογοῖ τε καὶ
 διὰ τὰς μαρμαρυγὰς ἀδυνατοῖ καθορᾶν ἐκέυα, ὧν
 D τότε τὰς σκιὰς εἴωρα, τί ἂν οἶει αὐτὸν εἰπεῖν, εἰ
 τις αὐτῷ λέγοι, ὅτι τότε μὲν εἴωρα φλυαρίας, νῦν
 δὲ μᾶλλον τι ἐγγυτέρω τοῦ ὄντος καὶ πρὸς μᾶλλον

^a Cf. *Parmen.* 130 D, *Tim.* 51 B, 52 A, and my *De Platonis Idearum doctrina*, pp. 24-25; also E. Hoffmann in *Wochenschrift f. klass. Phil.* xxxvi. (1919) pp. 196-197. As we use the word tree of the trees we see, though the reality (αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστι) is the idea of a tree, so they would speak of the shadows as the world, though the real reference known to them would be to the objects that cause the shadows, and back of the objects to the things of the "real" world of which they are copies. The general meaning, which is quite certain, is that they would suppose the shadows to be the realities. The text and the precise turn of expression are doubtful. See crit. note. *παριόντα* is intentionally ambiguous in its application to the shadows or to the objects which cast them. They suppose that the names refer to the passing shadows, but (as we know) they

that they saw^a they were naming the passing objects?" "Necessarily." "And if their prison had an echo^b from the wall opposite them, when one of the passers-by uttered a sound, do you think that they would suppose anything else than the passing shadow to be the speaker?" "By Zeus, I do not," said he. "Then in every way such prisoners would deem reality to be nothing else than the shadows of the artificial objects." "Quite inevitably," he said. "Consider, then, what would be the manner of the release^c and healing from these bonds and this folly if in the course of nature^d something of this sort should happen to them: When one was freed from his fetters and compelled to stand up suddenly and turn his head around and walk and to lift up his eyes to the light, and in doing all this felt pain and, because of the dazzle and glitter of the light, was unable to discern the objects whose shadows he formerly saw, what do you suppose would be his answer if someone told him that what he had seen before was all a cheat and an illusion, but that now, being nearer to reality really apply to the objects. Ideas and particulars are homonymous. Assuming a slight illogicality we can get some- what the same meaning from the text *ταῦτά*. ^g Do you not think that they would identify the passing objects (which strictly speaking they do not know) with what they saw?"

Cf. also P. Corssen, *Philologische Wochenschrift*, 1913, p. 286. He prefers *οὐκ αἰνρά* and renders: "Sie würden in dem, was sie sähen, das Vorübergehende selbst zu benennen glauben."

^b The echo and the voices (515 A) merely complete the picture.

^c Cf. *Phaedo* 67 D *λύσει*, and 82 D *λύσει τε καὶ καθαριμῶ*. *λύσις* became technical in Neoplatonism.

^d Lit. "by nature." *φύσις* in Plato often suggests reality and truth.

ὄντα τετραμμένους ὀρθότερα βλέποισι, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν παριόντων δεικνὺς αὐτῷ ἀναγκαῖοι ἐρωτῶν ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὅ τι ἔστιν; οὐκ οἶει αὐτὸν ἀπορεῖν τε ἂν καὶ ἠγεῖσθαι τὰ τότε ὀρώμενα ἀληθέστερα ἢ τὰ νῦν δεικνύμενα; Πολύ γ', ἔφη.

II. Οὐκοῦν κἂν εἰ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ φῶς ἀναγκαῖοι E αὐτὸν βλέπειν, ἀλλεὶν τε ἂν τὰ ὄμματα καὶ φεύγειν ἀποστρεφόμενον πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ἃ δύνανται καθορᾶν, καὶ νομίζειν ταῦτα τῷ ὄντι σαφέστερα τῶν δεικνυμένων; Οὕτως, ἔφη. Εἰ δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐντεῦθεν ἔλκοι τις αὐτὸν βία διὰ τραχείας τῆς ἀναβάσεως καὶ ἀνάντους καὶ μὴ ἀνείη πρὶν ἐξελεύσεσθαι εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς, ἄρα οὐχὶ ὀδυνᾶσθαι τε ἂν καὶ ἀγανακτεῖν ἐλκόμενον, καὶ 516 ἐπειδὴ πρὸς τὸ φῶς ἔλθοι, αὐγῆς ἂν ἔχοντα τὰ ὄμματα μεστὰ ὄραν οὐδ' ἂν ἐν δύνασθαι τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἀληθῶν; Οὐ γὰρ ἂν, ἔφη, ἐξαίφνης γε. Συνηθείας δὲ, οἶμαι, δέοντ' ἂν, εἰ μέλλοι τὰ ἄνω ὄψεσθαι· καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τὰς σκιάς ἂν ῥᾶστα καθορῶ, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι τὰ τε τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων εἰδῶλα, ὕστερον δὲ αὐτά· ἐκ δὲ τούτων τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν οὐρανὸν νύκτωρ ἂν ῥᾶον θεάσαιτο, προσβλέπων τὸ B τῶν ἄστρον τε καὶ σελήνης φῶς, ἢ μεθ' ἡμέραν

^a The entire passage is an obvious allegory of the painful experience of one whose false conceit of knowledge is tested by the Socratic elenchus. Cf. *Soph.* 230 B-D, and for ἀπορεῖν *Meno* 80 A, 84 B-C, *Theaet.* 149 A, *Apol.* 23 D. Cf. also *What Plato Said*, p. 513 on *Meno* 80 A, Eurip. *Hippol.* 247 τὸ γὰρ ὀρθοῦσθαι γινώσκων ὀδυνᾶ, "it is painful to have one's opinions set right," and *infra* 517 A, *supra* 494 D.

^b Cf. *Theaet.* 175 B, Boethius, *Cons.* iii. 12 "quicumque in superum diem mentem ducere quaeritis"; *infra* 529 A, 521 C, and the Neoplatonists' use of ἀνάγειν and their

and turned toward more real things, he saw more truly? And if also one should point out to him each of the passing objects and constrain him by questions to say what it is, do you not think that he would be at a loss^a and that he would regard what he formerly saw as more real than the things now pointed out to him?^b "Far more real," he said.

II. "And if he were compelled to look at the light itself, would not that pain his eyes, and would he not turn away and flee to those things which he is able to discern and regard them as in very deed more clear and exact than the objects pointed out?" "It is so," he said. "And if," said I, "someone should drag him thence by force up the ascent^b which is rough and steep, and not let him go before he had drawn him out into the light of the sun, do you not think that he would find it painful to be so haled along, and would chafe at it, and when he came out into the light, that his eyes would be filled with its beams so that he would not be able to see^c even one of the things that we call real?" "Why, no, not immediately," he said. "Then there would be need of habituation, I take it, to enable him to see the things higher up. And at first he would most easily discern the shadows and, after that, the likenesses or reflections in water^d of men and other things, and later, the things themselves, and from these he would go on to contemplate the appearances in the heavens and heaven itself, more easily by night, looking at the light of the stars and the moon, than by day "anagogical" virtue and interpretation. Cf. Leibniz, ed. Gerhardt, vii. 270.

^c Cf. *Laws* 897 D, *Phaedo* 99 D.

^d Cf. *Phaedo* 99 D. Stallbaum says this was imitated by Themistius, *Orat.* iv. p. 51 B.

τὸν ἥλιόν τε καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου. Πῶς δ' οὐ;
 Τελευταῖον δὴ, οἶμαι, τὸν ἥλιον, οὐκ ἐν ὕδασι
 οὐδ' ἐν ἀλλοτρίᾳ ἔδρα φαντάσματα αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ'
 αὐτὸν καθ' αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ χώρα δύναιτ' ἂν
 κατιδεῖν καὶ θεάσασθαι οἷός ἐστιν. Αναγκαῖον,
 ἔφη. Καὶ μετὰ ταῦτ' ἂν ἡδη συλλογίζοιτο περὶ
 αὐτοῦ ὅτι οὗτος ὁ τὰς τε ὥρας παρέχων καὶ
 ἐνιαυτοὺς καὶ πάντα ἐπιτροπεύων τὰ ἐν τῷ
 ὁρωμένῳ τόπῳ, καὶ ἐκείνων, ὧν σφέεις ἑώρων,
 τρόπον τινὰ πάντων αἴτιος. Δῆλον, ἔφη, ὅτι ἐπὶ
 ταῦτα ἂν μετ' ἐκέυνα ἔλθοι. Τί οὖν; ἀναμνη-
 σκόμενον αὐτὸν τῆς πρώτης οἰκήσεως καὶ τῆς ἐκεί
 σοφίας καὶ τῶν τότε ζυνδρασμοτῶν οὐκ ἂν οἶει αὐτὸν
 μὲν εὐδαιμονίζεν τῆς μεταβολῆς, τοὺς δὲ ἐλεεῖν;
 Καὶ μάλα. Τίμαί δὲ καὶ ἔπανοι εἴ τυρες αὐτοῖς
 ἦσαν τότε παρ' ἀλλήλων καὶ γέρα τῷ ὀξύτατα καθ-
 ορώντι τὰ παριόντα, καὶ μνημονεύοντι μάλιστα
 ὅσα τε πρότερα αὐτῶν καὶ ὕστερα εἰώθει καὶ ἅμα
 πορεύεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ τούτων δὴ δυνατώτατα ἀπο-
 μαντευομένῳ τὸ μέλλον ἦξεν, δοκεῖς ἂν αὐτὸν
 ἐπιθυμητικῶς αὐτῶν ἔχειν καὶ ζηλοῦν τοὺς παρ'
 ἐκείνους τιμωμένους τε καὶ ἐνδυναστεύοντας, ἢ τὸ
 τοῦ Ὀμήρου ἂν πεποιθέναί καὶ σφόδρα βούλεσθαι

^a It is probably a mistake to look for a definite symbolism in all the details of this description. There are more stages of progress than the proportion of four things calls for. All that Plato's thought requires is the general contrast between an unreal and a real world, and the goal of the rise from one to the other in the contemplation of the sun, or the idea of good. Cf. 517 B-C.

^b i.e. a foreign medium.
^c Cf. 508 B, and for the idea of good as the cause of all things cf. on 509 B, and *Introd.* pp. xxxv-xxxvi.
 P. Corsen, *Philol. Wochenschrift*, 1913, pp. 287-288, unnecessarily proposes to emend ὧν σφέεις ἑώρων to ὧν σκιάς ἐ. or

the sun and the sun's light.^a "Of course." "And so, finally, I suppose, he would be able to look upon the sun itself and see its true nature, not by reflections in water or phantasms of it in an alien setting,^b but in and by itself in its own place." "Necessarily," he said. "And at this point he would infer and conclude that this it is that provides the seasons and the courses of the year and presides over all things in the visible region, and in some sort the cause^c of all these things that they had seen." "Obviously," he said, "that would be the next step." "Well then, if he recalled to mind his first habitation and what passed for wisdom there, and his fellow-bondsmen, do you not think that he would count himself happy in the change and pity them^d?" "He would indeed." "And if there had been honours and commendations among them which they bestowed on one another and prizes for the man who is quickest to make out the shadows as they pass and best able to remember their customary precedences, sequences and co-existences,^e and so most successful in guessing at what was to come, do you think he would be very keen about such rewards, and that he would envy and emulate those who were honoured by these prisoners and lorded it among them, or that he would feel with Homer^f and greatly

ὧν σφέεις σκιάς ἐ., "ne sol umbrarum, quas videbant, auctor fuisse dicatur, cum potius earum rerum, quarum umbras videbant, fuerit auctor," ^d Cf. on 486 A, p. 10, note a.

^e Another of Plato's anticipations of modern thought. This is precisely the Humian, Comtian, positivist, pragmatist view of causation. Cf. *Gorg.* 501 A τριβῆ καὶ ἐμπειρία μνήμη μόνον σωζομένη τοῦ εἰωθότος γίγνεσθαι, "relying on routine and habitude for merely preserving a memory of what is wont to result." (Loeb tr.)

^f *Odyss.* xi. 489. The quotation is almost as apt as that at the beginning of the *Crito*.

ἐπάρουρον ἐόντα θητενέμεν ἄλλω ἀνδρὶ παρ' ἀκλήρῳ καὶ ὄτιον ἀν πεπονθέναι μᾶλλον ἢ κείνῳ Ἐ τε δοξάζειν καὶ ἐκέινως ζῆν; Οὕτως, ἔφη, ἔγωγε οἶμαι, πᾶν μᾶλλον πεπονθέναι ἀν δέξασθαι ἢ ζῆν ἐκέινως. Καὶ τότε δὴ ἐνόησον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. εἰ πάλιν ὁ τοιοῦτος καταβὰς εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν θάκον καθίζοιτο, ἀρ' οὐ σκότους ἀν πλέως¹ σχοιή τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς, ἐξαίφνης ἦκων ἐκ τοῦ ἡλίου; Καὶ μάλα γ', ἔφη. Τὰς δὲ δὴ σκιὰς ἐκέινως πάλιν εἰ δέοι αὐτὸν γνωματεύοντα διαμιλλᾶσθαι τοῖς ἀείδουσιν ἐκέινως, ἐν ᾧ ἀμβλυώττει, πρὶν καταστήναι τὰ ὄμματα, οὗτος δ' ὁ χρόνος μὴ πάνυ ὀλίγος εἴη τῆς συνηθείας, ἀρ' οὐ γέλωτ' ἀν παράσχοι, καὶ λέγοιτο ἀν περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὡς ἀναβὰς ἄνω διεφθαρμένος ἦκει τὰ ὄμματα, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἄξιον οὐδὲ πειρᾶσθαι ἄνω ἵέναι; καὶ τὸν ἐπιχειροῦντα λύειν τε καὶ ἀπαγγεῖν, εἴ πως ἐν ταῖς χερσὶ δύναιτο λαβεῖν καὶ ἀποκτείνειν, ἀποκτείνουσαι ἀν²; Σφόδρα γ', ἔφη.

III. Ταύτην τοῖνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὴν εἰκόνα, ᾧ φίλε Γλαύκων, προσαπτότεον ἄπασαν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λεγομένοις, τὴν μὲν δι' ὄψεως φαινομένην ἔδραν τῆ τοῦ δεσμοτηρίου οἰκῆσαι ἀφομοιοῦντα, τὸ δὲ τοῦ πυρὸς ἐν αὐτῇ φῶς τῆ τοῦ ἡλίου δυνάμει· τὴν δὲ ἄνω ἀνάβασον καὶ θέαν τῶν ἄνω τὴν εἰς τὸν νοητὸν

¹ ἀν πλέως Stallb., ἀνάπλεως mss., ἀν ἀνάπλεως Baiter. See Adam *ad loc.* on the text.

² ἀποκτείνειν, ἀποκτείνουσαι ἀν F; ἀποκτείνειν, ἀποκτείνουσαι ἀν AD Iamblichus; ἀποκτείνειν, ἀποκτείνουσαι ἀν M, ἀποκτείνουσαι ἀν ci. Baiter.

³ On the metaphor of darkness and light *cf.* also *Soph.* 254 A.

⁴ Like the philosopher in the court-room. *Cf.* *Theaet.* 172 c, 173 c ff., *Gorg.* 484 d-e. *Cf.* also *supra* on 487 c-d. 515 d, *infra* 517 d, *Soph.* 216 d, *Laches* 196 b, *Phaedr.* 249 d.

prefer while living on earth to be serf of another, a landless man, and endure anything rather than opine with them and live that life?" "Yes," he said, "I think that he would choose to endure anything rather than such a life." "And consider this also," said I, "if such a one should go down again and take his old place would he not get his eyes full^a of darkness, thus suddenly coming out of the sunlight?" "He would indeed." "Now if he should be required to contend with these perpetual prisoners in 'evaluating' these shadows while his vision was still dim and before his eyes were accustomed to the dark—and this time required for habituation would not be very short—would he not provoke laughter,^b and would it not be said of him that he had returned from his journey aloft with his eyes ruined and that it was not worth while even to attempt the ascent? And if it were possible to lay hands on and to kill the man who tried to release them and lead them up, would they not kill him^c?" "They certainly would," he said.

III. "This image then, dear Glaucon, we must apply as a whole to all that has been said, likening the region revealed through sight to the habitation of the prison, and the light of the fire in it to the power of the sun. And if you assume that the ascent and the contemplation of the things above is the soul's

^a An obvious allusion to the fate of Socrates. For other stinging allusions to this *cf.* *Gorg.* 486 b, 521 c, *Meno* 100 b-c. *Cf.* Hamlet's "Wormwood, wormwood" (iii. ii. 191). The text is disputed. See *crit. note.* A. Drachmann, "Zu Platons Staat," *Hermes*, 1926, p. 110, thinks that an *οφει* or something like it must be understood as having preceded, at least in Plato's thought, and that ἀποκτείνουσαι can be taken as a gloss or variant of ἀποκτείνουσαι and the correct reading must be λαβεῖν, καὶ ἀποκτείνουσαι ἀν. See also Adam *ad loc.*

τόπον τῆς ψυχῆς ἄνοδον τιθεῖς οὐχ ἀμαρτήσῃ τῆς γ' ἐμῆς ἐλπίδος, ἐπειδὴ ταύτης ἐπιθυμῆς ἀκούειν· θεὸς δέ που ὀδεν, εἰ ἀληθῆς οὖσα τυγχάνει. τὰ δ' οὖν ἐμοὶ φαινόμενα οὕτω φαίνεται, ἐν τῷ γνωστῷ τελευταία ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα καὶ μόγις ὀράσθαι, ὀφθείσα δὲ συλλογιστέα εἶναι ὡς ἄρα πᾶσι πάντων αὕτη ὄρθων τε καὶ καλῶν αἰτία, ἐν τε ὀρατῷ φῶς καὶ τὸν τούτου κύριον τεκοῦσα, ἐν τε νοητῷ αὐτῇ κυρία ἀλήθειαν καὶ νοῦν παρασχομένη, καὶ ὅτι δεῖ ταύτην ἰδεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα ἐμφρόνως πράξεν ἢ ἰδιά ἢ δημοσίᾳ. Συνολόμαι, ἔφη, καὶ ἐγώ, ὃν γε δὴ πρόπον δύναμαι. Ἰθι τοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τόδε ξυνοήθητι καὶ μὴ θαυμάσῃς ὅτι οἱ ἐνταῦθα ἐλθόντες οὐκ ἐθέλουσι τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράττειν, ἀλλ' ἄνω αἰεὶ ἐπείγονται αὐτῶν αἰ ψυχὰι διατρίβειν· εἰκὸς γάρ που οὕτως, εἴπερ αὐτὸ κατὰ τὴν προειρημένην εἰκόνα τοῦτ' ἔχει. Εἰκὸς μέντοι, ἔφη. Τί δέ; τόδε οἶε τι θαυμαστόν, εἰ ἀπὸ θείων, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, θεωριῶν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπειά τις ἐλθὼν κακὰ ἀσχημονεῖ τε καὶ φαίνεται σφόδρα γελοῖος ἔτι ἀμβλυώττων καὶ πρὶν ἱκανῶς συνήθησθαι

^a Cf. 508 B-C, where Arnou (*Le Désir de dieu dans la philosophie de Plotin*, p. 48) and Robin (*La Théorie platon. de l'âme*, pp. 83-84) make τόπος νοητός refer to *le ciel astronomique* as opposed to the *ὑπερουράνιος τόπος* of the *Phaedrus* 247 A-E, 248 B, 248 D-249 A. The phrase *νοητός κόσμος*, often attributed to Plato, does not occur in his writings.

^b Plato was much less prodigal of affirmation about metaphysical ultimates than interpreters who take his myths literally have supposed. Cf. *What Plato Said*, p. 515, on *Meno* 86 B.

ascension to the intelligible region,^a you will not miss my surmise, since that is what you desire to hear. But God knows^b whether it is true. But, at any rate, my dream as it appears to me is that in the region of the known the last thing to be seen and hardly seen is the idea of good, and that when seen it must needs point us to the conclusion that this is indeed the cause for all things of all that is right and beautiful, giving birth^c in the visible world to light, and the author of light and itself in the intelligible world being the authentic source of truth and reason, and that anyone who is to act wisely^d in private or public must have caught sight of this." "I concur," he said, "so far as I am able." "Come then," I said, "and join me in this further thought, and do not be surprised that those who have attained to this height are not willing^e to occupy themselves with the affairs of men, but their souls ever feel the upward urge and the yearning for that sojourn above. For this, I take it, is likely if in this point too the likeness of our image holds." "Yes, it is likely." "And again, do you think it at all strange," said I, "if a man returning from divine contemplations to the petty miseries^f of men cuts a sorry figure^g and appears most ridiculous, if, while still blinking through the gloom, and before he has become sufficiently accustomed

^c Cf. 506 E.

^d This is the main point for the *Republic*. The significance of the idea of good for cosmogony is just glanced at and reserved for the *Timaeus*. Cf. on 508 B, p. 102, note a and pp. 505-506. For the practical application cf. *Meno* 81 D-E. See also *Introd.* pp. xxxv-xxxvi.

^e Cf. 521 A, 345 E, and Vol. I. on 347 D, p. 81, note d.

^f Cf. 346 E.

^g Cf. *Theaet.* 174 c ἀσχημονύνη.

γενέσθαι τῷ παρόντι σκότῳ ἀναγκαζόμενος ἐν δικαστηρίοις ἢ ἄλλοθι που ἀγωνίζεσθαι περὶ τῶν τοῦ δικαίου σκιῶν ἢ ἀγαλμάτων ἂν αἰ σκιαί, καὶ Ἐ διαμιλλᾶσθαι περὶ τούτου, ὅπῃ ποτὲ ὑπολαμβάνεται ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῆν δικαιοσύνην μὴ πρόποτε ἰδόντων; Οὐδ' ὀπωσιῶν θανμασόν, ἔφη. Ἄλλ' 518 εἰ νοῦν γε ἔχοι τις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μεμνήτ' ἂν, ὅτι διτταὶ καὶ ἀπὸ διττῶν γίνονται ἐπιπαραξέεις ὀμμασαν, ἕκ τε φωτὸς εἰς σκότος μεθισταμένων καὶ ἕκ σκότους εἰς φῶς· ταῦτὰ δὲ ταῦτα νομίσας γίνεσθαι καὶ περὶ ψυχῆν, ὅποτε ἴδιοι θορυβουμένην τινὰ καὶ ἀδυνατουσάν τι καθορᾶν, οὐκ ἂν ἀλογίστως γελῶ, ἀλλ' ἐπισκοποῖ ἂν πότερον ἐκ φανότερου βίου ἤκουσα ὑπὸ ἀηθείας ἐσκότῳται ἢ Β ἐξ ἀμαθίας πλείονος εἰς φανότερον ἰούσα ὑπὸ λαμπρότερου μαρμαρυγῆς ἐμπέλησται, καὶ οὕτω δὴ τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίσειεν ἂν τοῦ πάθους τε καὶ βίου, τὴν δὲ ἐλεήσειεν, καὶ εἰ γελᾶν ἐπ' αὐτῇ βούλοιο, ἦττον ἂν καταγέλαστος ὁ γέλως αὐτῷ εἴη ἢ ὁ ἐπὶ τῇ ἄνωθεν ἐκ φωτὸς ἠκούση. Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, μετρίως λέγεις.

IV. Δεῖ δή, εἶπον, ἡμᾶς τοιόνδε νομίσαι περὶ αὐτῶν, εἰ ταῦτ' ἀληθῆ, τὴν παιδείαν οὐχ οἶαν τυνὲς ἐπαγγελλόμενοι φασιν εἶναι τοιαύτην καὶ εἶναι.

^a For the contrast between the philosophical and the pettyfogging soul cf. *Theaet.* 173 c-175 e. Cf. also on 517 A, p. 128, note b.

^b For ἀγαλμάτων cf. my *Idea of Good in Plato's Republic*, p. 237, *Soph.* 234 c, *Polit.* 303 a.

to the environing darkness, he is compelled in court-rooms^a or elsewhere to contend about the shadows of justice or the images^b that cast the shadows and to wrangle in debate about the notions of these things in the minds of those who have never seen justice itself?" "It would be by no means strange," he said. "But a sensible man," I said, "would remember that there are two distinct disturbances of the eyes arising from two causes, according as the shift is from light to darkness or from darkness to light,^c and, believing that the same thing happens to the soul too, whenever he saw a soul perturbed and unable to discern something, he would not laugh^d unthinkingly, but would observe whether coming from a brighter life its vision was obscured by the unfamiliar darkness, or whether the passage from the deeper dark of ignorance into a more luminous world and the greater brightness had dazzled its vision.^e And so he would deem the one happy in its experience and way of life and pity the other, and if it pleased him to laugh at it, his laughter would be less laughable than that at the expense of the soul that had come down from the light above." "That is a very fair statement," he said.

IV. "Then, if this is true, our view of these matters must be this, that education is not in reality what some people proclaim it to be in their profes-

^a Aristotle, *De an.* 422 a 20 f. says the over-bright is ἀόρατον but otherwise than the dark.

^b Cf. *Theaet.* 175 D-E.

^c Lit. "or whether coming from a deeper ignorance into a more luminous world, it is dazzled by the brilliance of a greater light."

^d i.e. only after that. For οὕτω δή in this sense cf. 484 D, 429 D, 443 E, *Charm.* 171 E.