# How to choose? <br> Preferences, Utility and Stochastic Dominance 

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Praha

## Motivation

## Does it ever happen that we need to make a choice?

## Motivation

## Does it ever happen that we need to make a choice? <br> Every day

## Motivation

# Do you run an optimization model to make your choice? 

## Motivation

# Do you run an optimization model to make your choice? Typically not... 

## Motivation

# But still, is your decision somehow rational? 

## Motivation

# But still, is your decision somehow rational? Hopefully... 

## Motivation

## When a choice is rational?

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How can we choose between different alternatives?

When a choice is rational? How can we choose between different alternatives?
All of you would choose the same?

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How can we choose between different alternatives?
All of you would choose the same?
We try to tackle these issues during this presentation

- Risk: situation where both possible outcomes and their probabilities are known (models)
- Risk: situation where both possible outcomes and their probabilities are known (models)
- Uncertainty: situation either where possible outcomes or their probabilities are not known (life)

Economic agents are assumes to behave according to their preferences.
Two main relationships are used to describe preferences:

- "to be preferred to" $(\succeq)$ : when the payoffs represented by vector $x$ are preferred to payoffs in vector $y$

$$
x \succeq y
$$

- "to be indifferent to" $(\sim)$ : when the payoffs represented by vector $x$ are indifferent to payoffs in vector $y$

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x \sim y
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- "to be indifferent to" $(\sim)$ : when the payoffs represented by vector $x$ are indifferent to payoffs in vector $y$

$$
x \sim y
$$

Actually

$$
\begin{equation*}
x \succeq y \wedge y \succeq x \Rightarrow x \sim y \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

So we can just study the $\succeq$ relation and the other is only a sub-case.

An economic agent is said to be rationale if her preferences are

- complete: an agent is always able to define her preferences when facing a choice (strong condition). This means that

$$
\begin{equation*}
\forall x, y \quad \text { either } x \succeq y \vee y \succeq x \vee x \sim y \text { is true } \tag{2}
\end{equation*}
$$

- transitive: given three vectors $x, y, z$

$$
\begin{equation*}
x \succeq y \wedge y \succeq z \Rightarrow x \succeq z \tag{3}
\end{equation*}
$$

- continue: given three vectors $x, y, z$

$$
\begin{equation*}
\forall x \succeq y \succeq z \Rightarrow \exists \lambda \in[0,1]: \lambda x+(1-\lambda) z \sim y \tag{4}
\end{equation*}
$$

## Theorem

If preferences are rational (complete and transitive), and continuous, then there exist a (continuous) function $U(\cdot)$ (so-called "utility function") such that

$$
x \succeq y \Leftrightarrow U(x) \geq U(y)
$$

Of course, the utility function is not unique. Any increasing function does not alter the inequality. For any $V(\cdot)$ increasing:

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U(x) \geq U(y) \Leftrightarrow V(U(x)) \geq V(U(y))
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## Preferences (no Risk)

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Utility functions are good for ordering, not for measuring!

Further properties for a reasonable utility function $U(\cdot)$. Utility is

- increasing: an agent always prefers more to less, i.e.

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\begin{equation*}
\frac{\partial U(x)}{\partial x}>0 \tag{5}
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Is it really always true? What about satiety?

- concave: the marginal utility is decreasing

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{\partial^{2} U(x)}{\partial x^{2}}<0 \tag{6}
\end{equation*}
$$

Previous theorem is useful to study situation without risk. In presence of risk we need another assumption:

- independence: if an agent prefers $x$ to $y$ and must chose between two bundles $(x, z)$ and $(y, z)$ containing $z$ in the same proportion, then she will chose $(x, z)$.

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\begin{equation*}
x \succeq y \Leftrightarrow \forall z, \lambda \in[0,1]: \lambda x+(1-\lambda) z \succeq \lambda y+(1-\lambda) z \tag{7}
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If preferences are rationale (complete and transitive), continuous and independent, then there exist a (continuous) function (so-called "utility function") such that

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x \succeq y \Leftrightarrow \mathbb{E}[U(x)] \geq \mathbb{E}[U(y)]
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\begin{aligned}
& \text { Gain Probability } \\
& x=\{5 \mathrm{mil} .1 \\
& y=\left\{\begin{array}{cc}
0 & 0.01 \\
5 \text { mil. } & 0.89 \\
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## Expected utility can fail!!

But still, in most cases, we can say something useful with utilities. For instance we can interpret the risk attitude of an investor.

Assume there are two possible outcomes $W_{1}$ and $W_{2}$ having respectively utility $U\left(W_{1}\right)$ and $U\left(W_{2}\right)$. The expected utility lines on the straight line between the two points (see figure!), what about the utility of the combination between $W_{1}$ and $W_{2}$ ?

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If $U(\mathbb{E}[W])<\mathbb{E}[U(W)]$ then the agent is risk-lover

## Expected utility

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Arrow-Pratt (Absolute) Risk Aversion:

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A R A=-\frac{U^{\prime \prime}(W)}{U^{\prime}(W)}
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Arrow-Pratt (Absolute) Risk Aversion:

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The aversion can change with the wealth level, then we introduce the Arrow-Pratt (Relative) Risk Aversion:

$$
R R A=-\frac{U^{\prime \prime}(W) W}{U^{\prime}(W)}
$$

Then, we can distinguish:
CARA Constant
IARA Increasing
DARA Decreasing
HARA Hyperbolic

The most general form of the utility function is the following:

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\begin{equation*}
U(W)=\frac{(\alpha+\gamma W)^{1-\frac{\beta}{\gamma}}-1}{\gamma-\beta} \tag{8}
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\begin{gather*}
U^{\prime}(W)=(\alpha+\gamma W)^{-\frac{\beta}{\gamma}}  \tag{9}\\
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Then, fixing values for $\alpha, \beta$ and $\gamma$, we obtain all the classes.
CARA $\alpha=1, \gamma=0$
IARA $\gamma=-\beta$
DARA $\alpha=1 \gamma=1$
HARA any

## Another experiments

Assume you invest 100 and you can get the following equiprobable realizations.

$$
x=\left[\begin{array}{c}
98 \\
105 \\
110
\end{array}\right], \quad y=\left[\begin{array}{c}
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105 \\
110
\end{array}\right], \quad y=\left[\begin{array}{c}
98 \\
105 \\
107
\end{array}\right] \\
98 \\
105 \\
110
\end{array} \geq \begin{gathered}
98 \\
\end{gathered} \geq 105 \begin{gathered}
\geq
\end{gathered}
$$

## Another experiments

How can we test these kinds of preferences (dominances)?

$$
\begin{array}{r}
x=\left[\begin{array}{c}
98 \\
105 \\
110
\end{array}\right], \quad y=\left[\begin{array}{c}
98 \\
105 \\
107
\end{array}\right] \\
98 \\
105 \\
110
\end{array} \geq \begin{gathered}
98 \\
\end{gathered} \geq 105
$$

First order dominance!

## Another experiments

How can we test these kinds of preferences (dominances)?

$$
\begin{aligned}
& x=\left[\begin{array}{c}
98 \\
105 \\
110
\end{array}\right], \quad y=\left[\begin{array}{c}
98 \\
105 \\
107
\end{array}\right] \quad x=\left[\begin{array}{c}
90 \\
105 \\
110
\end{array}\right], \quad y=\left[\begin{array}{c}
98 \\
105 \\
107
\end{array}\right] \\
& 98 \geq 98 \\
& 105 \geq \\
& 110 \geq 105
\end{aligned}
$$

First order dominance!

## Another experiments

How can we test these kinds of preferences (dominances)?

$$
\left.\begin{array}{rl}
x=\left[\begin{array}{c}
98 \\
105 \\
110
\end{array}\right], & y=\left[\begin{array}{c}
98 \\
105 \\
107
\end{array}\right] \\
98 & \geq \\
105 & \geq \\
110 & \geq \\
105 \\
105 \\
110
\end{array}\right], \quad \operatorname{cum}(x)=\left[\begin{array}{c}
90 \\
195 \\
305
\end{array}\right], \quad \operatorname{cum}(y)=\left[\begin{array}{c}
98 \\
105 \\
107
\end{array}\right]
$$

First order dominance!

## Another experiments

How can we test these kinds of preferences (dominances)?

$$
\left.\begin{array}{rr}
x=\left[\begin{array}{c}
98 \\
105 \\
110
\end{array}\right], & y=\left[\begin{array}{c}
98 \\
105 \\
107
\end{array}\right] \\
98 & \geq
\end{array} \begin{array}{c}
90 \\
105 \\
110
\end{array}\right], \quad y=\left[\begin{array}{c}
98 \\
105 \\
107
\end{array}\right]
$$

First order dominance!

## Another experiments

How can we test these kinds of preferences (dominances)?

$$
\left.\begin{array}{rr}
x=\left[\begin{array}{c}
98 \\
105 \\
110
\end{array}\right], & y=\left[\begin{array}{c}
98 \\
105 \\
107
\end{array}\right] \\
98 \\
98 & \geq \\
105 \\
110 & \geq \\
105 \\
110
\end{array}\right], \quad y=\left[\begin{array}{c}
98 \\
105 \\
107
\end{array}\right]
$$

First order dominance!
Second order dominance!

Given two distributions $X$ and $Y$ we define that $X$ first-order stochastically dominates $Y$ if

$$
\begin{equation*}
\mathbb{P}(X \leq \eta) \leq \mathbb{P}(Y \leq \eta) \quad \text { for all } \eta \in \Re \tag{12}
\end{equation*}
$$

Given two distributions $X$ and $Y$ we define that $X$ first-order stochastically dominates $Y$ if

$$
\begin{equation*}
\mathbb{P}(X \leq \eta) \leq \mathbb{P}(Y \leq \eta) \quad \text { for all } \eta \in \Re \tag{12}
\end{equation*}
$$

In terms of cumulative functions $F_{X}$ and $F_{Y}$

$$
\begin{equation*}
F_{X}(\eta) \leq F_{Y}(\eta), \forall \eta \in \Re \tag{13}
\end{equation*}
$$

Given two distributions $X$ and $Y$ we define that $X$ first-order stochastically dominates $Y$ if

$$
\begin{equation*}
\mathbb{P}(X \leq \eta) \leq \mathbb{P}(Y \leq \eta) \quad \text { for all } \eta \in \Re \tag{12}
\end{equation*}
$$

In terms of cumulative functions $F_{X}$ and $F_{Y}$

$$
\begin{equation*}
F_{X}(\eta) \leq F_{Y}(\eta), \forall \eta \in \Re \tag{13}
\end{equation*}
$$

Moreover, $X$ first-order stochastically dominates $Y$ if and only if every expected utility maximizer with an nondecreasing utility function prefers $X$ over $Y: \mathbb{E}[U(X)] \geq \mathbb{E}[U(Y)], \forall U \in \mathcal{U}_{1}$, where $\mathcal{U}_{1}$ is the set of all nondecreasing utility functions.

Given two distributions $X$ and $Y$ we define that $X$ first-order stochastically dominates $Y$ if

$$
\begin{equation*}
\mathbb{P}(X \leq \eta) \leq \mathbb{P}(Y \leq \eta) \quad \text { for all } \eta \in \Re \tag{12}
\end{equation*}
$$

In terms of cumulative functions $F_{X}$ and $F_{Y}$

$$
\begin{equation*}
F_{X}(\eta) \leq F_{Y}(\eta), \forall \eta \in \Re \tag{13}
\end{equation*}
$$

Moreover, $X$ first-order stochastically dominates $Y$ if and only if every expected utility maximizer with an nondecreasing utility function prefers $X$ over $Y: \mathbb{E}[U(X)] \geq \mathbb{E}[U(Y)], \forall U \in \mathcal{U}_{1}$, where $\mathcal{U}_{1}$ is the set of all nondecreasing utility functions.

If the random variables are discrete and taking $n$ values each with probability $1 / n: \mathbf{X} \geq \mathbf{P} \cdot \mathbf{Y}$, where $\mathbf{P}$ is a permutation matrix.

Defining the twice cumulative distribution function as

$$
\begin{equation*}
F_{X}^{(2)}(\eta)=\int_{-\infty}^{\eta} F_{X}(\alpha) d \alpha \tag{14}
\end{equation*}
$$

Given two distributions $X$ and $Y$ we define that $X$ second-order stochastically dominates $Y$ if

$$
\begin{equation*}
F_{X}^{(2)}(\eta) \leq F_{Y}^{(2)}(\eta), \forall \eta \in \Re \tag{15}
\end{equation*}
$$

Defining the twice cumulative distribution function as

$$
\begin{equation*}
F_{X}^{(2)}(\eta)=\int_{-\infty}^{\eta} F_{X}(\alpha) d \alpha \tag{14}
\end{equation*}
$$

Given two distributions $X$ and $Y$ we define that $X$ second-order stochastically dominates $Y$ if

$$
\begin{equation*}
F_{X}^{(2)}(\eta) \leq F_{Y}^{(2)}(\eta), \forall \eta \in \Re \tag{15}
\end{equation*}
$$

Moreover, $X$ second-order stochastically dominates $Y$ if and only if every expected utility maximizer with an nondecreasing and concave utility function prefers $X$ over $Y: \mathbb{E}[U(X)] \geq \mathbb{E}[U(Y)], \forall U \in$ $\mathcal{U}_{2}$, where $\mathcal{U}_{2}$ is the set of all nondecreasing and concave utility functions.

Defining the twice cumulative distribution function as

$$
\begin{equation*}
F_{X}^{(2)}(\eta)=\int_{-\infty}^{\eta} F_{X}(\alpha) d \alpha \tag{14}
\end{equation*}
$$

Given two distributions $X$ and $Y$ we define that $X$ second-order stochastically dominates $Y$ if

$$
\begin{equation*}
F_{X}^{(2)}(\eta) \leq F_{Y}^{(2)}(\eta), \forall \eta \in \Re \tag{15}
\end{equation*}
$$

Moreover, $X$ second-order stochastically dominates $Y$ if and only if every expected utility maximizer with an nondecreasing and concave utility function prefers $X$ over $Y: \mathbb{E}[U(X)] \geq \mathbb{E}[U(Y)], \forall U \in$ $\mathcal{U}_{2}$, where $\mathcal{U}_{2}$ is the set of all nondecreasing and concave utility functions.
If the random variables are discrete and taking $n$ values each with probability $1 / n: \mathbf{X} \geq \mathbf{W} \cdot \mathbf{Y}$, where $\mathbf{W}$ is a double stochastic matrix.

## Conclusions

## Conclusions

Observation

## Conclusions

## Observation

Reason

## Conclusions

## Observation

Reason

Consequence

## Conclusions

Observation For daily life decisions you face uncertainty, not risk

Reason

Consequence

Observation For daily life decisions you face uncertainty, not risk

Reason

you do not know the probability

Consequence

Observation For daily life decisions you face uncertainty, not risk

Reason<br>you do not know the probability

Consequence use utility for preferences!!

## Conclusions

Observation For model decisions you face risk

Reason

Consequence

## Conclusions

Observation For model decisions you face risk

Reason
you do know the probability

Consequence

Observation For model decisions you face risk

Reason

you do know the probability

Consequence use expected utility for preferences!!

## Conclusions

Observation The agent has some attitude

Reason

Consequence

Observation The agent has some attitude

Reason risk-averse, risk-neutral, risk-lover, ...

Consequence

Observation The agent has some attitude

Reason risk-averse, risk-neutral, risk-lover, ...

Consequence use appropriate utility function!!

## Conclusions

Observation To choose the utility function could be challenging

Reason

Consequence

# Observation <br> To choose the utility function could be challenging 

Reason each risk-attitude may have multiple utility functions

Consequence

Observation To choose the utility function could be challenging

Reason each risk-attitude may have multiple utility functions

Consequence use stochastic dominance!!

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## Děkuji moc

